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The design of democratic institutions is a critical factor in determining
their capacity to forestall, or limit the escalation of, identity-based conflict. In
particular, the incorporation of dispute resolution mechanisms in institutional
structures can create new spaces that facilitate dialogue and, potentially,
greater recognition between disputants. Institutions, though, do more than
merely provide alternative or new fora for dialogue: they can also serve to
frame the terms of such interaction and, in so doing, funnel and re-articulate
conceptions of justice and the public interest. Furthermore, they can enable
the "bottom-up" negotiation of "satisfiers"--those measures capable of
meeting or accommodating the multiple interests at stake. In this way,
institutional design can bear directly upon the quality of democratic dialogue,
serving either to expand or diminish the reserves of political opportunity. We
argue that focusing greater attention on the design of dispute resolution
mechanisms can help counteract the polarizing tendencies of elite
mobilization. As procedural devices of dialogic interaction, such mechanisms
can build consensus about the conception of justice underpinning public life,
and so provide societies with "morally defensible processes" capable of
responding to conflict in politics.' This implies that such mechanisms can
constrain political self-interest, cap expectations about what democracy can
realistically deliver, and encourage hitherto weak or non-existent consensus.
The following section (Part 1) relates dispute system design to theories of
democratic dialogue, and in particular, Habermasian theories of
communicative action. It develops the concept of "democratic triangulation,"
which we use to illustrate the important role that alternative dispute
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resolution (ADR) mechanisms can play in mediating the relationship
between democratic institutions and normative cultural values. Part II
documents the background to the Northern Ireland Parades Commission (the
Commission), established in 1997 to invigorate efforts to resolve the
seemingly intractable issue of contentious parades. We argue that while
parade disputes evidence a "crisis consciousness at the periphery," 2 the
Commission demonstrates the contribution that dispute system design can
make to the resolution of identity-based conflict. The Parades Commission-
its structure and processes of framing and bargaining-is then examined in
Part III, while Part IV of the Article returns to the concept of democratic
triangulation, and analyzes the design strengths and weaknesses of the
Parades Commission against this benchmark.
I. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
Sociological approaches to law have long encouraged an expansive
vision of what legal institutions might achieve.3 Nonet and Selznick, for
example, describe the ideal of "responsive law" as "a facilitator of response
to social needs and aspirations."'4 Examples of design innovation typically
include: de-centered nodes of governance which allow for wider participation
and more nuanced discussion in democratic decisionmaking; 5 public fora and
collaborative ventures which capture, distill, and give voice to previously
excluded narratives; monitoring and accountability mechanisms which
provide early warnings and absorb disaffection before it can assume
rhetorical capital; codes of practice and conduct which assist in stabilizing
public expectations; and enhanced capacity for third-party intervention
enabling the de-escalation of seemingly intractable conflicts. Our concern in
this Article, however, is not with legal institutions per se, but rather with how
2 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 382 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press
1996) (emphasis omitted).
3 Following Cohen and Deason, we adopt Robert Keohane's broad definition of
institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations." Amy J. Cohen & Ellen E.
Deason, Elements of Institutional Design for Conflict Resolution 1 n. 1 (Aug. 22, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
4 PHILLIPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANsIToN: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW 14-15 (2001).
5 See, e.g., LES JOHNSTON & CLIFFORD SHEARING, GOVERNING SECURITY:
EXPLORATIONS IN POLICING AND JUSTICE 148-150 (2003).
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law can construct, or leave open the possibility of, dispute resolution
mechanisms beyond itself.
International human rights norms have emphasized that inclusive modes
of governance are underpinned by a dialogic imperative. The preamble to the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, for
example, states that "the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is
necessary to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of
division, but of enrichment for each socitty. ' ' 6 But legal norms can yield to
prescription, and the "template of an ideal polity" has been "used as leverage
to try to quell ethnic conflict."' 7 In this light, we stress from the outset that
institutional design processes must be elicitive rather than prescriptive.
Social interactions and the institutions through which they are processed are
both constituted by and constitutive of the cultural context in which they
operate.8 Manlio Cinalli thus argues that "the prescription of institutional
solutions cannot be separated from the empirical assessment of relationships
and exchanges across institutions and civil society."9 Similarly, John Paul
Lederach states that "the design of conflict responses is a creative process
that requires innovation and inventiveness in adapting to the dynamic and
constantly evolving contexts of deep-rooted conflict."' 10 That is not to imply
that any evaluation of a culturally situated example of institutional design
will be of little heuristic value. Indeed, Jtirgan Habermas acknowledges that
6 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities pmbl., February
1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm; see also Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities art. 6, 15, February 1, 1995,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/l57.htm.
7 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Pushing the Limits of the Liberal Peace: Ethnic
Conflict and the "Ideal Polity ", in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 128, 141
(David Wippman ed., 1998).
8 See Cohen & Deason, supra note 3, at 6. (stating that "institutions are deeply
entwined with social practices and thus are both shaped by and shape the societies in
which they operate"); see also NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 4, at 14; Guyora Binder &
Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (1997); P.A.J.
Waddington, Controlling Protest in Contemporary Historical and Comparative
Perspective, in POLICING PROTEST: THE CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 117, 138-39 (Donatella Della Porta & Herbert Reiter eds.,
1998).
9 Manlio Cinalli, Below and Beyond Power Sharing: Relational Structures Across
Institutions and Civil Society, in POWER SHARING: NEW CHALLENGES FOR DIVIDED
SOCIETIES 172 (Ian O'Flynn & David Russell eds., 2005).
10 John Paul Lederach, Building Mediative Capacity in Deep-Rooted Conflict, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 91, 95 (2002).
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one should seek to determine "the conditions for a rational political will-
formation.. . at the social level of institutionalized processes of deliberation
and decision making." l Our analysis of the Parades Commission proposes
that attention to the detail of dispute system design can help realize the ideal
of responsive law-particularly during moments of "inertia."'1 2 Moreover, in
addition to serving their primary instrumental function, dispute resolution
mechanisms can also serve to deepen democracy.
Despite the unremarkable nature of this claim, the connections between
ADR mechanisms and the quality of democratic dialogue are relatively
unexplored. While it has been suggested that "modem democratic processes
can be thought of as mediation writ large,"' 13 Richard Reuben notes that
"[w]ith rare exception, the question of the relationship
between... democracy and dispute resolution generally, has simply fallen
through the cracks of scholarly attention."' 14 Joseph Stulberg asserts that "the
mediation process can be used as an engine for constructive, democratic
social change,"' 5 and building on this premise, Gemma Smyth urges that if
"ADR theorists and practitioners are framers of democracy and 'meaningful
justice,"' greater consideration must be given to design issues. This is
especially so given that "even minor variations in process and practice can
produce quite different types of interactions. ' 16 As Axel Hadenius asserts,
democratic development is contingent upon prevailing institutional
conditions:
To serve a democratic function, the organizations in question should
have deep popular roots, and a capacity to channel opinion from the bottom
up. They should function autonomously of the state, yet they ought also to
11 HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 340-41.
12 Id. at 326.
13 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual
Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 30 (2000).
14 Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 281 (2004). Examples are readily found:
championing his conception of "reflective democracy," Robert Goodin admits that he
leaves both empirical inquiry and institutional-design considerations for discussion at a
later date. ROBERT E. GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY 18-19 (2003). Similarly, Manlio
Cinalli concludes by "opening space for further empirical investigation of social and
political processes beyond prescriptive discussions of desirable institutional
arrangements." Cinalli, supra note 9, at 184.
15 Joseph B. Stulberg, Questions, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 531, 537 (2002).
16 Gemma Smyth, Considering Democracy and ADR: Diversity Based Practice in
Public Collaborative Processes, 19 WINDSOR REv. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 13, 22 (2005).
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have links, directly or indirectly, into the political sphere. Alongside this
mobilizing and channelling function, moreover, an ability to bridge
divisions and to interact with people of another orientation must be present.
This requires that, within the organizational sphere, there be a conflict-
dampening capacity: an ability to moderate, to discipline, and to negotiate.
In this regard, the social context can be more favourable or less. 17
We can elaborate on this generic paradigm by looking to the ideal speech
conditions of Habermasian theories of communicative action. Habermas
suggests that parties to a conflict can reach agreement only if significant
background consensus exists, thereby limiting the number of issues which
remain contested and removing certain issues from challenge altogether.18 In
the absence of such consensus, parties will seek to further their own interests
strategically rather than attempting to resolve the conflict communicatively., 9
Any short-term resolution will be based on threats and strategic promises
rather than negotiated bargains involving mutual compromises. 20 As
17 AXEL HADENIUS, INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 101, 127 (2001). It
has been argued that the social context in Northern Ireland tends towards the less
favorable end of the spectrum for such "bottom up" democratization: "Those who cherish
utopian hopes of building democracy from the local community level up have only to
look at the reality of locally based community conflict on the parades issue to check their
optimistic vision. The view that democracy should be based on participative community-
based politics is untenable in Northern Ireland." Cathal McCall & Arthur Williamson,
Governance and Democracy in Northern Ireland: The Role of the Voluntary and
Community Sector after the Agreement, 14 GOVERNANCE 363, 372 (2001). It is also
noteworthy that "the establishment of democratic institutions does not automatically yield
political transformations toward[] democratic politics. In fact, many of the 'third wave'
democratic transitions have yielded a co-existence of formal liberal democratic
institutions and non-democratic politics." Kristian Stokke, Building the Tamil Eelam
State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTE-controlled Areas in
Sri Lanka 5, available at
http://folk.uio.no/stokke/Publications/Building%20the%20state.pdf.
18 HABERMAS, supra note 2, at xvi-xvii, and 322-326; see also 2 HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 119-152 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Polity Press,
1987) [hereinafter THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION].
19 Habermas states: "I call interactions 'communicative' when the participants
coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point
being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims." Jirgen
Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification, in THE
COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY 60, 63 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred R. Dallmayr
eds., MIT Press 1990).
20 As Robert Goodin notes:
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Rosenfeld points out, however, this theory presupposes rational discourse,
and assumes certain substantive norms.21 It excludes, for example,
conceptions of the good which reject prescriptive equality.22 It also rules out
parties who hold incompatible metaphysical perspectives (deriving from
dogma or ideology). 23 Thus,
[W]hether communicative action can carve out a common ground for justice
encompassing all of its perspectives-depends on the nature of the
procedural devices involved in communicative action as well as on the
existence of material conditions making it plausible for the reversal of
perspectives (undertaken by actors engaged in communicative action) to
generate fruitful consensuses or compromises .... [T]he success of
Habermas's proceduralism to level the playing field would appear to
depend on whether the requisite levelling could be achieved through
dialogue, or whether it calls for predialogical or extradialogical
adjustments. 24
Rosenfeld's argument points to the difficulty of gauging whether or not
the disparate perspectives held by the parties to a particular conflict are so
incompatible as to render them impervious to any procedural devices of
[t]he sequence of moves and countermoves in an ordinary mixed-motive game just
involves each player doing the best she can for herself, given what the other has
done or is expected to do. Bargaining, in contrast, involves give-and-take aiming,
ultimately, at an agreed joint action. Bargaining, when successful, ends in an
agreement, whereas the most we get with ordinary mixed-motive games is an
equilibrium.
GOODIN, supra note 14, at 86.
21 Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice be Reconciled Through
Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas' Proceduralist Paradigm of Law, 17
CARDozo L. REv. 791, 811 (1995-96).
22 Id. at 812.
23 Habermas argues that "dogmatic worldviews and rigid patterns of socialization
can block a discursive mode of sociation." HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 325. Elsewhere,
he suggests that democracy might accommodate anti-democratic views so long as any
rule-breaking is conducted in a non-violent manner consistent with the constitution. See
also GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH
JORGEN HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 41-42, 73-74 (2003). Also noteworthy here
is the distinction made by Herbert Marcuse between "non-partisan tolerance" ("abstract"
or "pure" tolerance) and "partisan" tolerance-which is always "intolerant toward the
protagonists of the repressive status quo." Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A
CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81, 85 (R. P. Wolff et al. eds., 1969; see also G. H. Fox &
G. Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 68 (1995).
24 Rosenfeld, supra note 21, at 812, 814.
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communicative action.25 In identity-based conflicts, this suggests that there
might at least need to be some underlying consensus about the values of
democracy. As Smyth acknowledges, the concept of democracy being
pursued will itself fundamentally shape the type of interactions sought.26
While critical of Habermas' "serial" or "disjointed" approach to democratic
deliberation (where informal deliberation must first force its way into the
official political sphere),27 Goodin presents his own model of "reflective
democracy" which we adopt here as a yardstick.28 He conceives of a polity
which is "systematically responsive" 29---"deliberative in contradistinction to
many opposites: adversarial, ill-considered, individualistic, self-interested,
aggregative." 30  Properly crafted deliberative processes can produce
preferences which are more empathetic, considered, and far-reaching, 31 and
where inputs (their inclusivity and quality) matter (as opposed to a
Schumpeterian focus on bare aggregative outputs). 32 Institutions should
25 Id.
26 See Smyth, supra note 16, at 15, 17, 22. In periods of transition from conflict or
totalitarian rule to peace or more democratic forms of governance, some agreement about
the goals of transition may be necessary so that parties are amenable to dialogic will-
formation. For discussion of nominally democratic but potentially divergent values
underpinning interventions in parade disputes, see Michael Hamilton, Freedom of
Assembly, Consequential Harms and the Rule of Law: Liberty-Limiting Principles in the
Context of Transition, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (Nov. 29, 2005), available at
http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/rapidpdf/gqi038v 1.
27 Habermas views communicative action as being dependent on civic impulses
which bring conflicts from the periphery into the center of the political system. See
HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 330. He posits that there are two tracks of opinion-and will-
formation. The first (constitutional) track is that of democratic proceduralism and
institutionalized deliberation which extends only to political communities Id. at 305-06.
The second (informal) track comprises those other "culturally mobilized publics" and
networks-the general and unconstrained public sphere. Id. at 301. Describing this
"sphere of civil society," Habermas states that "its institutional core comprises those
nongovernmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor
the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the
lifeworld." Id. at 366-367.
28 Goodin, supra note 14, at 172-74.
29 Id. at 1, 163 (citing John D. May, Defining Democracy: A Bid for Coherence and
Consensus, 26 POL. STUD. 1 (1978)).
30 Id. at 3-4.
31 Id. at 7.
32 Id. at 9, 153-157; HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 332; see also J.A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 1947). Schumpeter's theory of
democracy prioritizes the centrality of competitive elections whereby elites (constituted
as political parties) present their respective policy packages to the electorate. The
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attend and respond to individuals' arguments and reasons-not merely their
"bottom lines."'33 The deliberative endgame for Goodin is that people be
"imaginatively present" rather than necessarily being "conversationally
present."' 34 Setting aside both Rosenfeld's caveat about the prerequisite
material conditions for communicative action, and Goodin's critique of
Habermas's structuration of the public sphere, we focus in this Article on an
example of a "procedural device" that might facilitate the emergence of
background consensus and the culling of oppositional preferences.
The need for background consensus suggests dual-and mutually
reinforcing-roles for the procedural devices of dispute resolution: (1) a pro-
active preparatory (pre- or extra-dialogical) process which frames the dispute
and seeks to establish a minimum consensus about the defining parameters;
and (2) a communicative bargaining process which builds on this foundation
with a view to encouraging sustainable, long-term agreement. This urges a
more nuanced approach to the dialectics of democratic consolidation, i.e., the
question of whether democratic culture is a prerequisite for, or consequence
of, the establishment of democratic institutions. 35 It challenges the idea that
democratic culture is a prerequisite for the establishment of democratic
institutions. 36 It also challenges the argument that the establishment of
democratic institutions is a necessary precursor to the development of
democratic culture. 37 As neither culture nor institutions are inert and non-
reflexive, the protean relationship between the two can be mediated by these
procedural devices of framing and bargaining. This model of "democratic
triangulation" implies a cyclical budding of institutional reform and
normative values, the synergy of which denies institutional or cultural factors
aggregate vote is the only lever by which individual voters can influence policy
formulation.
33 GOODIN, supra note 14, at 16.
34 Id. at 171.
35 See DAVID CHANDLER, BOSNIA: FAKING DEMOCRACY AFTER DAYTON 12-13 (2d
ed. 1999) (citing Richard Rose, Where are Post Communist Countries Going?, 8 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 92, 97 (1997).
36 See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The Primacy of Culture, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 7, 8-9
(1995). Fukuyama argues that "social engineering on the level of institutions has hit a
massive brick wall." Id. at 9. We do not, though, underestimate the role of culture-as
Frank Wright argued, cultures "are systems of restraint upon mimetic rivalry. Without
culture, mimesis can expand without limits." FRANK WRIGHT, NORTHERN IRELAND: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 21 (Gill & Macmillan eds., 1987).
37 See, e.g., Staffan Lindeberg, The Surprising Significance of African Elections, 17
J. OF DEMOCRACY 139, 146-48 (2006). For a useful critical overview of the literature on
democratization, see CHANDLER, supra note 35, at 7-33.
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a veto on democratic innervation. It describes an organic model of
democratization in which dispute resolution mechanisms, beyond the
conventional institutions of law enforcement (police, courts, etc.), can enable
dialogue about contested conceptions of justice and the public interest. This,
in turn, can deepen commitment to democratic values, generate shared
expectations, and catalyze reforms in unresponsive institutions, ultimately
leading to the convergence of institutional and cultural values (or as close an
approximation thereto as is ever possible).
The Northern Ireland Parades Commission provides a useful case study
rather than a perfected or immediately transposable blueprint. It holds a light
to the failure of liberal democratic pluralism to provide a totalizing foil to the
escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, and lends itself to analysis for at
least four further reasons. First, as we describe below, the establishment of
the Commission in 1997 was an urgent response to widespread inter-
communal violence and disorder, and an indictment on the legal mechanisms
then in place to regulate public processions. 38 Given that institutional reform
and innovation is often crisis-led, the bargaining systems that develop when
overburdened state mechanisms of social integration give way are deserving
of close empirical scrutiny. Second, the Commission also represents an
attempt to address longstanding structural inequalities in the public sphere.
The Commission template therefore illustrates the potential capacity of an
institution to address entrenched identity-based conflict and deepen the roots
of democratic governance. Arguably, this is achieved by ensuring that the
body's membership is broadly representative of the affected constituencies,
by enabling and facilitating greater involvement of civil society in dispute
resolution processes, and by focusing on redefining the contested "public
interest" on a cross-communal basis. Third, the substantive work of the
Parades Commission-regulating access to public space-itself links the
themes of space, public power, and democratic participation. Contestation
over access to public space and the transgression of territorial boundaries
often has symbolic purchase as a metaphor for the nature of the polity-the
mobilization of the Civil Rights Movement in both the United States and
Northern Ireland being a prime example.39 Finally, the novel institutional
characteristics of the Parades Commission themselves recommend it as a
38 See Imelda McAuley, Reforming the Law on Contentious Parades, 1998 PUB. L.
44,51.
39 See, e.g., Selma Blow by Blow, in BERTRAM LEVINE, RESOLVING RACIAL
CONFLICT: THE COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1964-1989, at 45-73
(2005); NEIL JARMAN & DOMINIC BRYAN, FROM RIOTS TO RIGHTS: NATIONALIST
PARADES IN THE NORTH OF IRELAND 59-84 (1998).
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case study. The body has both adjudication and mediation functions, and the
benefits and disadvantages of this hybrid structure are instructive in
designing institutions that are at once responsive and capable of both
formulating and advancing long-term democratic policy objectives. 40
II. CRISIS CONSCIOUSNESS AND PARADE DISPUTES
IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Northern Ireland is a complex modem industrial society with large
disparities in class and wealth.41 It suffers from many of the same social and
economic problems as other Western European and North American
countries.42 It is, however, a transitional society emerging from years of
violent conflict.43 Of the 1.7 million populace, approximately 46% regard
themselves as belonging to the Protestant community (and, for the most part,
are ascribed as "Unionist" or "Loyalist" as they wish to remain part of the
United Kingdom) and 40% to the Catholic community (who, for the most
part, wish to be part of a politically united Ireland, and hence are ascribed as
"Nationalist" or "Republican"). 44 These divisions have been manifested in
many different contexts including employment and education. 45 Divisions
have also resulted in territorial separation along communal lines.46 In both
urban and rural areas, public space and housing is often defined as
"Protestant" or "Catholic. '47 In Belfast, sporadic violence and the fear of
attacks from the other community has led to the building of "peace walls"
40 See infra discussion Part III.B(2).
41 See, e.g., PAUL BEW, PETER GIBBON & HENRY PATTERSON, NORTHERN IRELAND
1921- 1994: POLITICAL FORCES AND SOCIAL CLASSES (1995).
42 For a broad comparative perspective, see WRIGHT supra note 36.
43 See, e.g., Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aol~in, Local Meets Global:
Transitional Justice in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 871 (2003); Christine
Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1095 (2003);
Angela Hegarty, The Government of Memory: Public Inquiries and the Limits of Justice
in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1148 (2003); Kieran McEvoy & John
Morison, "'Beyond the Constitutional Moment': Law, Transition and Peacemaking in
Northern Ireland", 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 961 (2003).
44 Figures based on the 2001 Northern Ireland census. See also Tom Hadden,
Putting People into their Boxes, FORTNIGHT No. 411, Feb. 2003, at 6.
45 JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND 265-
307 (1995).
46 BRENDAN MURTAGH, THE POLITICS OF TERRITORY: POLICY AND SEGREGATION IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 31-42 (2002).
47 Id.
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between "interface" areas. 48 Towns and villages are also often viewed as
being "Protestant" or "Catholic" with objects like war memorials or churches
becoming ethnic markers. 49  Indeed, ritual practices (including
commemorations, parades, and demonstrations) have played an important
performative role in defining communal identities. Within the Protestant
community, local marching bands and organizations such as the Orange
Order, the Apprentice Boys of Derry, and the Royal Black Institution
organize a wide range of parades. The majority of these events occur
between April and August, which is a period commonly referred to as "the
marching season." The best known parades are those held on the Twelfth of
July, commemorating Protestant King William's victory over Catholic King
James at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.50 While there are similar
organizations in the Catholic community (such as the Ancient Order of
Hibernians), they organize fewer parades, and these generally have less
political significance than those organized by local branches of the Orange
Order (known as Loyal Orange Lodges, LOL). Some more politically
oriented demonstrations are organized by Republican groups to
commemorate the Easter Rising, the Hunger Strike (May), and Internment
(August). There is also a large event held annually at the end of January in
Derry to commemorate Bloody Sunday. 51 Parades sustain a sense of locality
and territory. In this sense, parade routes can become determinants of spatial
inclusion and exclusion, and residents of the areas through which they pass
sometimes feel threatened. Processions, demonstrations, commemorations,
feast days, and even funerals have long provided the context for public
disorder in Northern Ireland, and parades were described as the
"distinguishing public order challenges" in Northern Ireland at the close of
the twentieth century. 52
48 See MARY CONWAY & JONNY BYRNE, INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT RESEARCH,
INTERFACE ISSUES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2005).
49 See PETER SHIRLOW & BRENDON MURTAGH, INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT RESEARCH,
BELFAST: SEGREGATION, VIOLENCE AND THE CITY 48-56 (Pluto Press 2006); NEIL
JARMAN, No LONGER A PROBLEM? SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2005).
5 0 See DOMINIC BRYAN, ORANGE PARADES: RITUAL TRADITION AND CONTROL 118-
138 (2000).
51 See JARMAN & BRYAN, supra note 39, at 72-77; Neil Jarman & Dominic Bryan,
Green Parades in an Orange State: Nationalist and Republican Commemorations and
Demonstrations from Partition to the Troubles, 1920-1970, in THE IRISH PARADING
TRADITION: FOLLOWING THE DRUM 95-110 (Tom Fraser ed., St. Martin's Press 2000)
[hereinafter Jarman & Bryan, Green Parades].
52 A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND 53 (1999) [hereinafter
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During the year 2004-2005, there were 3,342 parades in Northern
Ireland of which the largest number, 2,526, were categorized as "loyalist,"
whilst 195 were described as "others," and 621 as "nationalist. ' 53 Out of this
total, 229 parades were deemed to be "contentious" by the police and Parades
Commission.54 "Contentious" parades often require a heavy police presence
and may be restricted.55 In 2004-2005, 158 parades had restrictions imposed
upon them-the majority of these were route restrictions, but restrictions
were also often imposed on the timing of the parade, the music to be played,
the specific bands allowed to participate, and the dress of participants. 56 As
these figures indicate, parades have played a more central role in
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist political and religious cultural practice than in
the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community. 57 Indeed, the Catholic
community has never been accorded the same access to public space.58 This
could partly be explained by the fact that the law accorded a wide discretion
to the then Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 59 membership of which was
predominantly drawn from the Protestant community (in 1998, only 8% of its
members were Catholics). 60 In addition, the statutory criteria gave primacy to
PATrEN REPORT], available at http://www.belfast.org.uk/report.htm; see also DAVID W.
MILLAR, QUEEN'S REBELS: ULSTER LOYALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69 (1978);
Sean Farrell, Recapturing the Flag: The Campaign to Repeal the Party Processions Act
1860-1872, 32 EIRE-IRELAND 52, 70 (1997); Jacqueline Hill, National Festivals, the State
and 'Protestant Ascendancy' in Ireland, 1790-1829, 93 IRISH HIST. STUD. 30, 30 (1984).
53 PARADES COMM'N, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, at 7 (2005).
541Id.
55 See, e.g., Dominic Bryan, Drumcree: Marching Towards Peace in Northern
Ireland, in JORG NEUHEISER & STEFAN WOLFF, PEACE AT LAST? THE IMPACT OF THE
GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 94-110 (2002).
56 PARADES COMM'N supra note 53
57 Jarman & Bryan, Green Parades, supra note 51, at 95-110.
58 Id.
59 Prior to the establishment of the Parades Commission, parades and counter-
demonstrations were governed by the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. See,
e.g., Brigid Hadfield, Public Order Police Powers and Judicial Review, 1993 CRIM. L.
REV. 915. Professor David Feldman described these discretionary powers as being
"staggeringly wide," for they failed "to provide narrowly drawn, reasonable, objective,
and definite standards to guide the exercise of discretion." DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 821-22 (1993).
60 PATTEN REPORT, supra note 52, at 82. Due to fifty-fifty recruitment provisions,
almost 20% of regular officers are now from the Catholic community, with a target to
meet the Patten goal of 30% by 2010. See The Office of the Oversight Commissioner,
available at http://www.oversightcommissioner.org/ (follow, "Reports, Composition and
Recruitment" hyperlink; then follow "Overseeing the Proposed Revisions for the Policing
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the potential for disorder as the basis for restricting public events, and so the
police generally yielded to the greatest threat.6 1 Consequently, the law was
widely criticized for providing "an incentive for those who threaten
disorder." 62
When parade disputes escalated in the mid-1990s, 63 a number of
mediative interventions occurred (sometimes concurrently) outside of the
legal framework. On occasion, these involved local church leaders,
representatives of the business community, local politicians, and sometimes
Services of Northern Ireland - Report 13 - Published 09.06.2005" hyperlink); see also
RONALD WEITZER, POLICING UNDER FIRE: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLICE-COMMUNITY
RELATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995); MARY O'RAWE & LINDA MOORE, COMMITTEE
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS ON DUTY: PRINCIPLES FOR BETTER
POLICING-INTERNATIONAL LESSONS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (1997).
61 One example is provided by the case of An Application by McManusfor Judicial
Review (NIQB, May 4, 1990) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported
Cases). Here, the organizer of a republican Hungerstrike Commemoration parade,
notified to take place on May 6, 1990 through Belfast city center, challenged the police
decision to re-route the parade away from the city center on the basis of a purported risk
of serious public disorder. Id. at 1. It emerged that the police concern was not that the
parade of itself would be disorderly, but that a parade "by this organisation may well
attract to the city centre persons opposed to the ideals of the marchers and that serious
public disorder will result." Id. at 4. Arguing that the police direction was discriminatory,
counsel for the applicant pointed to the fact that the RUC had facilitated the Twelfth of
July processions through a republican area despite the existence of a similar threat of
disorder. Id. at 4. Furthermore, while Loyalist parades were allowed in Belfast city
center, no Nationalist parades had been allowed in the city center since 1981. Id. at 4. In
reply, the judge simply stated that "[t]his is a fact but having heard the Chief
Superintendent I am satisfied that no such discriminatory policy exists or is applied by
the police." Id. at 4. Three cases-R v. Secretary of State ex parte Breen (NIQB, July 7,
1992) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases), Re Armstrong (NIQB,
1992) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases), and In The Matter Of
An Application By Gary Jones For Judicial Review (NIQB, July 10, 1996) (LEXIS,
Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases)-involving police decisions not to
give any directions for the re-routing of loyalist parades substantiate the view that
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist events were not generally predisposed to restriction. That
said, police did restrict Orange marches in a number of areas-and did so increasingly
after 1994-but because none of these decisions were the subject of a legal challenge, the
judicial review cases viewed in isolation present a distorted picture.
6 2 PETER NORTH, OLIVER CRILLY & JOHN DUNLOP, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
PARADES AND MARCHES 1997, at 128, 157 (1997) [hereinafter THE NORTH REPORT].
63 There were parade disputes in approximately twenty to twenty-five towns and
cities across Northern Ireland in 1996 and 1997. See NEIL JARMAN ET AL., POLITICS IN
PUBLIC: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND THE RIGHT TO PROTEST: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
27-30 (1998).
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also the police. This undoubtedly encouraged "forum shopping," where
parties participated only in those processes they believed would deliver their
strategic goals. In 1995, a contentious parade from Drumcree Parish Church
in the town of Portadown resulted in the Mediation Network organization 64
being invited by the assistant chief constable to mediate between
representatives of the Orange Order, the Garvaghy Road Residents
Association (GRRC), and the RUC.65 These talks took the form of "shuttle
mediation" (or "intermediation"), and three days into the impasse, against a
background of heightened security fears, an accommodation was reached
between residents' leaders and the police. 66 This entailed a limited parade
(involving only the local Portadown District Orange Lodge) along the
Garvaghy Road.67 During the same year, in Belfast, only two out of a
notified twelve Loyalist parades were allowed by the police to pass along the
Lower Ormeau Road in 1995.68 Behind the scenes mediation, facilitated by
Quaker House, resulted in an unprecedented agreement signed on July 10 by
the Lower Ormeau Concerned Community (LOCC) and Ballynafeigh
District Orange Lodge.69 While this agreement broke down, it was used by
the police as the template for future decisions-no parades would be allowed
unless agreement was reached.
64 Now "Mediation Northern Ireland." This is an independent, civil society
organization.
65 See BRENDAN MCALLISTER & JOE CAMPBELL, STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE
MEDIATION NETWORK IN JULY 1996 REGARDING THEIR ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN
DRUMCREE IN 1995 (1996), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/parade/docs/mn 1379
6.htm.
66 Id.
67 Id. The basis of this accommodation, however, remains a matter of dispute-the
then Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Annesley, later denied that the Acting Deputy Chief
Constable, Ronnie Flanagan, had given any indication to residents that future parades
would only take place with the consent of the local community (despite this assurance
being witnessed by Mediation Network). See also BRENDAN MCALLISTER, MEDIATION
AND THE DRUMCREE CONFLICT: THE POTENTIAL FOR INTERVENTION IN 2000, at 5-6
(2000); NEIL JARMAN & DOMINIC BRYAN, PARADE AND PROTEST: A DISCUSSION OF
PARADING DISPUTES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 62-63 (1996); THE NORTH REPORT, supra
note 62, at 34.
68 The two parades which were not restricted were the Orange parade on July 12 and
the parade by the Apprentice Boys on August 12 that marked the anniversary of the
"Relief of Derry." See JARMAN & BRYAN, supra note 67, at 42-50, 72-73; see also
GRAiNNE KELLY & SUSAN ALLEN NAN, ART OF MEDIATION PROJECT, MEDIATION IN
PRACTICE 63 (Grainne Kelly ed., 1998).
69 JARMAN & BRYAN, supra note 67, at 63-67.
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In July 1996, Orangemen were initially prevented from marching to
Portadown town center from Drumcree Parish Church along the Garvaghy
Road by a decision by then Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Annesley.70 This
decision precipitated widespread public disorder on a scale rarely witnessed
before in Northern Ireland. Orangemen and their supporters blocked major
roads and hijacked vehicles. 71 Despite marathon attempts to reach an
accommodation, 72 the decision was reversed on public order grounds
following the murder of Michael McGoldrick, a Catholic taxi driver, and the
parade was allowed to proceed. 73 This decision did nothing to reduce
tensions. Nationalists and Republicans were outraged by the u-turn, and in
the rioting and destruction of property which ensued, another civilian,
Dermot McShane, was crushed to death by a police vehicle in
Derry/Londonderry. 74 As David Feldman states, "[t]he way in which these
matters were handled gave rise to further polarisation of the already divided
community in Northern Ireland, and intensified suspicion of the motives of
the RUC and unhappiness about the apparent vacillation of its Chief
Constable. ' '75
Nonetheless, in August 1996, direct face-to-face meetings between
residents and the Royal Black Preceptory (RBP) occurred in the towns of
Bellaghy and Dunloy, and a series of meetings took place between the
Apprentice Boys and the Bogside Resident's Group in Derry/Londonderry. 76
In Bellaghy, these talks resulted in a one-off written agreement in relation to
the RBP parade on August 31, although no agreement was reached in either
70 See generally CHRIS RYDER & VINCENT KEARNEY, DRUMCREE: THE ORANGE
ORDER'S LAST STAND (2001) (providing a detailed narrative of the events at Drumcree).
For a largely "Trimble-ite" perspective, see GORDON LUCY, STAND-OFF! DRUMCREE:
JULY 1995 AND 1996 (Ulster Society Ltd. 1996). For the perspective of the Garvaghy
Road residents, see GARVAGHY RESIDENTS, GARVAGHY: A COMMUNITY UNDER SIEGE
142-67 (1999).
71 RYDER & KEARNEY, supra note 70 at 142.
72 Id. at 149-60. These talks were led by the Church of Ireland Primate, Archbishop
Robin Eames, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop, Cardinal Cahal Daly.
73 Id at 165-68.
7 4 COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, ThE MISRULE OF LAW: A
REPORT ON THE POLICING OF EVENTS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1996 IN NORTHERN IRELAND
43-44(1996).
75 David Feldman, Society of Public Law Teachers, Address at the Meeting of the
Public Law Section at the University of Birmingham, Achieving Transparency and
Accountability in Public-Order Decision-Making." Evaluating the North Report on
Parades in Northern Ireland (Apr. 5-6, 1997).
76 KELLY & NAN, supra note 68, at 32-33, 36, 51-56.
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Dunloy or Derry/Londonderry. 77 Indeed, the RUC increasingly made efforts
to engage with both parties to disputes. In August 1996, for example, Ronnie
Flanagan, then deputy chief constable, initially acted as an intermediary
between Bellaghy Concerned Residents (BCR) and the RBP.78 In the same
year, in Newtownbutler:
[1]ocal RUC officers... took the initiative to begin a process of
communication between the [Newtownbutler Area] residents association
and the [Royal Black] Preceptory. The Chief Inspector for the area and his
Superintendent devised a strategy between them; the Chief Inspector would
work with the nationalist residents and the Superintendent with Preceptory
members. Making it clear that the RUC did not want to lay ownership to
any agreement or decision but wished to facilitate dialogue and keep lines
of communication open, they initiated a series of meetings.79
These meetings (each side meeting separately with the RUC) did not lead
to agreement. 80 But on the day of the parade, facing a standoff between a
reported 50 marchers and 150 protesters, RUC officers again acted as go-
betweens by carrying messages from one group to another.81 A compromise
was then proposed by the chief inspector which was accepted by members of
Newtownbutler Area Residents Association (NARA). 82 As Kelly notes, "[i]t
is significant that although support for the RUC was at a very low ebb in the
summer of 1996 (in both the Nationalist and Unionist communities) in the
aftermath of Drumcree, the RUC could play a role at all. ' 83
77 In both cases the parades were ultimately prevented form taking place. In Dunloy,
when direct discussions broke down between the RBP and residents in August 1996, 150
residents gathered to protest against the RBP parade, and, following discussions with the
police, the parade organizers agreed to a re-routing. KELLY & NAN, supra note 68, at 35-
36. In Derry/Londonderry, following the breakdown of discussions (in which the BRG
had argued that a solution in Derry should be linked to disputed Apprentice Boys parades
in Bellaghy, Dunloy and the lower Ormeau) and against the background of the violence
at Drumcree, the Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew, imposed a ban on all parades
along part of the city wall in Derry between August 7-31, 1996. Id. at 56. This was the
only occasion between 1987 and 1997 that the Secretary of State's powers under article 5
of the Public Order (NI) Order 1987 were used. The equivalent banning powers of the
Secretary of State under the Public Processions Act have never been used.
78 See KELLY & NAN, supra note 68, at 31-32.




83 Id. at 48.
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By having to make decisions about parade routes, and then enforce those
same decisions, the RUC's role was inevitably politicized.8 4 As long ago as
1985, then Chief Constable Jack Hermon, stated that too much was expected
of the police in effecting political and community reconciliation.8 5 He argued
that "it may perhaps be worth considering if responsibility for decisions on
the holding and routing of parades should rest with an independent public
tribunal. '86 A similar argument was made by Professor Brigid Hadfield in
1993.87 Yet, it was not until 1998 that similar proposals were brought
forward by the government following the recommendations of the
Independent Review of Parades and Marches (the North Review). 88 This
review reported after just six months of work in January 1997, and sought to
encourage the participation of individual groups in the design of the
processes affecting them:
The Review team directly invited written evidence from interested
parties, placed advertisements in daily newspapers, and distributed 15,000
leaflets with the text of the advertisement to libraries and Citizens' Advice
Bureaux. The team also visited the locations of some of the more
contentious parades to gain a better appreciation of the local geography,
observed certain parades, held 93 separate meetings involving more than
270 individuals, and, following an open tender, commissioned Research
84 This point was highlighted in THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 135-36. See
also Imelda McAuley, supra note 38 at 46.
85 CHRIS RYDER, THE RUC 1922-2000: A FORCE UNDER FIRE 333 (Arrow Books
2000).
86 RUG CHIEF CONSTABLE'S REPORT 1985, at xv. Sir John Hermon repeated this
view ten years later, arguing that it was "absolutely essential" to establish an independent
mechanism for deciding which marches went ahead rather than leaving it to the RUC.
AUTHOR, TITLE, BELFAST NEWS LETER, July 15, 1996. See also DOMINIC BRYAN,
TOM FRASER, & SEAMUS DUNN, POLITICAL RITUALS: LOYALIST PARADES IN PORTADOWN
35 (1995); JARMAN & BRYAN, supra note 67, at 53 (citing Sinn Fein councillor, Barry
McElduff, calling for the establishment of an independent Commission); JARMAN &
BRYAN, supra note 67, at 79 (citing Ballynafeigh Orangeman Noel Liggett's support for a
wider forum to discuss the parading issue, including "loyalist orders, local politicians,
wider representatives and church leaders."); JARMAN & BRYAN, supra note 67, at 120-22
(supplying consideration of "A Parading Commission"); JARMAN & BRYAN, supra note
67, at 128-30 (providing consideration of "A Parading Tribunal" and "A Judicial
Tribunal" respectively).
87 Hadfield, supra note 59, at 924-25.
88 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62. The three person review team, appointed by
the Secretary of State, was led by Dr. Peter North (now Sir Peter), then Vice-Chancellor
of Oxford University. The other two members were Fr. Oliver Crilly and the Very Rev.
Dr. John Dunlop.
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and Evaluation Services (based in Belfast) to conduct a major survey of the
attitudes of the public towards parades. A number of smaller questionnaire-
based surveys were also carried out.89
Given that the North Review was only instigated following widespread
violence associated with the 1996 Drumcree dispute, it supports Habermas's
claim that a "crisis consciousness at the periphery" 90 sometimes has to make
its way "into the core of the political system and there receive formal
consideration" through "sensational actions" and "mass protests." 91 It is
significant, though, that the Parades Commission was designed outside of the
political negotiations aimed at settling the constitutional conundrum and
bringing finality to thirty years of intercommunal violence. The use of this
exceptional ad hoc law reform mechanism was intended to shield the peace
process from the fallout of parade disputes. As Campbell, Bell, and Ni
Aoldin have noted, "institutional reform can occur incrementally outside the
initial, formal, negotiating process, and works to address the causes of
conflict on a more piecemeal basis. This practical reality means that
institutional reforms become intrinsically tied up with the ongoing
experiment of political accommodation." 92
The North Review represented an attempt to address the systemic
failures highlighted by the partisan regulation of public processions in
Northern Ireland. The challenge was to find some means of bringing Irish
nationalism into the symbolic center of the regulatory apparatus without
excluding Ulster unionism by doing so. The review team's key
recommendation was the establishment of a five member independent body
whose members would "have a geographical spread, and both cross-
community and gender balance. '93 This body, to be called the "Parades
Commission, '9 4 would perform three broad functions:
8 9 BRICE DICKSON & MICHAEL HAMILTON, RE-FORMING LAW REFORM IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 20 (2000). "It is worth noting that, contemporaneously with the North Review,
the Community Relations Council of Northern Ireland (an official but non-statutory
body) commissioned and published (in January 1997) a report entitled The Legal Control
of Marches in Northern Ireland, by Tom Hadden and Anne Donnelly." Id.
90 HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 382 (emphasis in original).
91 Id. at 381.
92 Christine Bell, Colim Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Justice Discourses in
Transition, 13 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 305, 313 (2004).
93 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 141.
9 4 Id. at 140.
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I. Allow interested parties to put their views forward about proposed
parades,
2. Encourage them to settle difficulties locally, and where that proved
impossible,
3. Itself to come to a view on what, if any, conditions should be imposed
on contentious parades after an appropriately transparent process of
examination of all the relevant issues against the background of
reformed legal provisions.95
The Commission was established on March 27, 1997, but with neither
statutory foundation nor its proposed adjudicatory role.96 The government
felt that the latter required further time-limited consultation given the
"radical and far-reaching" 9 7 impact of transferring powers from the police to
the Commission. While there was no agreement reached over the Drumcree
parade in 1997 (and the police decision to again allow it to proceed resulted
in serious public disorder), violence was less widespread than during the
previous two summers.98 The situation was greatly eased when, in the early
hours of July 11, the Orange Order announced that it would voluntarily re-
route its Twelfth of July parades on the Lower Ormeau Road and in Newry,
Armagh, and Derry/Londonderry. 99
The commissioners had no adjudicatory powers until February 1998
when the newly elected Labour Government enacted the Public Processions
(NI) Act 1998 (the PPA). This placed the Commission on a legislative
footing and transferred to it the adjudicatory powers previously held by the
police-a move described by David Feldman as a "constitutional
innovation." 100 In 1998, it was therefore the Parades Commission-not the
police-that re-routed the Drumcree parade. A massive security operation
was put in place to enforce the Commission's determination, and a protest
involving thousands of people supporting the Orangemen ensued.' 0 ' It was
95 Id. at 138.
96 289 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1997) 508.
97 Id.
98 KELLY & NAN, supra note 68, at 57-61.
99 Ryder and Kearney state that some members of the Orange Order now believe
that then Chief Constable, Ronnie Flanagan, "exaggerated the security situation"
(including information that an IRA sniper attack was planned for the march through the
Shambles area of Armagh) to pressure the Orange Order into cancelling some of its
contentious parades. See RYDER & KEARNEY, supra note 70, at 225-26.
100 David Feldman, supra note 75, at 8. See also THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62,
at 158; Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998, c.2, at § 2(2)(b).
101 See RYDER & KEARNEY, supra note 70, at 227-78.
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only reduced after three young boys were burnt to death in Ballymoney after
a petrol bomb was thrown at a house.10 2 Many moderate Orangemen
withdrew from the protest, but an Orange protest at Drumcree has been
continued up until the present day (September 2006).103
While Drumcree-famously described in 1996 by a Protestant church
leader as Northern Ireland's "Chernobyl," and now in its twelfth year-has
remained relatively peaceful in recent years, on two occasions during the
2005 marching season, serious violence erupted in the aftermath of parades
in other locations. On July 12, 2005, stones, bricks, petrol, and blast bombs
were thrown by those opposed to the parade past the Ardoyne shop fronts in
North Belfast.104 In response, the police used water cannons and fired
twenty-one "AEP impact rounds."' 0 5 Two months later, the worst rioting in
Northern Ireland in almost ten years occurred after the Whiterock parade,
originally planned for June 25, 2005, but held on September 10 after efforts
to reach a local agreement broke down. Over the weekend of September 10-
11, 2005, Loyalists (including Orangemen and those sympathetic to the
Orange Order) engaged in serious violence:
It is estimated that 150 live rounds were fired at the police and military.
In addition, hundreds of blast bombs and petrol bombs were thrown at the
police, along with many other missiles including paving stones, bricks and
bottles. 93 police officers were injured, along with at least two serious
injuries in the military and an unknown number of civilian injuries. 167
vehicles were hijacked and set on fire and there was extensive damage to
property.... [T]he [Police Service of Northern Ireland] discharged six live
rounds, 238 AEP impact rounds and used water cannon[s] extensively. The
102 Id. at 270-73.
103 A parade on September 23, 2006 marked day 3000th of the Drumcree protest.
See Parades Commission,
http://www.paradescommission.org/parades/index.cfm/pkey/16945/details/true (last
visited Nov. 3, 2006).
104 The parade was organized by Ligoniel True Blues LOL 1932, Ballysillan LOL
1891, and Earl of Erne LOL 647. For comment, see Michael Hamilton, Parade Related
Protest: Is it the "Taking Part " that Counts?, JUST NEWS, July/Aug. 2005, at 3, available
at http://www.caj.org.uk/justnews/2005july.pdf.
105 "Attenuating Energy Projectiles." These replaced "plastic baton rounds"-a
weapon once frequently relied upon by the police in public order situations in Northern
Ireland. HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (UNCAT), NINETEENTH REPORT OF
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military discharged five live round[s] and 140 AEP impact rounds over the
same period. That no one was killed and that there were so few serious
injuries to police officers, the military or members of the public is
remarkable. 106
In 2006, the Whiterock parade passed off peacefully (as did the
contentious Tour of the North and Twelfth of July parades past Ardoyne), but
many other parades in towns and cities across Northern Ireland remain
contested, many accompanied by a risk of sectarian violence.10 7 This
suggests that, at some level, the interests of those on the periphery are not yet
being adequately articulated through institutional channels. The question of
whether or not the Parades Commission provides a model example of
responsive law-the paradigmatic function of which is conceived by Nonet
and Selznick in terms of "clarifying the public interest"' 08-- demands close
attention to the organizational dynamics of that body, and to questions of
"institutional design" and "institutional diagnosis."' 0 9 It is to these questions
that our attention now turns.
III. THE PARADES COMMISSION-TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW?
A. An Independent and Representative Body?
If institutions are to serve as "regularities in recurrent social
situations," 110 it is important that they are broadly acceptable to the groups
106 KEIR STARMER & JANE GORDON, N. IR. POLICING BD., REPORT ON THE POLICING
OF THE ARDOYNE PARADES 12th JULY 2005 AND THE WHITEROCK PARADE 10th
SEPTEMBER 2005, at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/word-docs/pdfs/sep_parades.pdf.
107 See, e.g., PARADES COMMISSION, 2006-2007 PARADING IN A PEACEFUL
NORTHERN IRELAND: FORWARD VIEW AND REVIEW OF PROCEDURES (2006), available at
http://www.paradescommission.org/publications/index.cfm. Foreword by Roger Poole
(Chairman of the Parades Commission), at 1: "[T]here is no sense of complacency within
the Commission. We know that there are many outstanding difficulties where contentious
parades and protests have yet to be fully addressed." Roger Poole, Chairman of the
Parades Commission, Forward to the PARADES COMMISSION, 2006-2007 PARADING IN A
PEACEFUL NORTHERN IRELAND: FORWARD VIEW AND REVIEW OF PROCEDURES (2006),
available at http://www.paradescommission.org/publications/index.cfm.
108 NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 4, at 109.
109 Id. at 111 (emphasis omitted).
110 INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, RECENT ECONOMIC THOUGHT SERIES 5 (David Weimer
ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995) (citing ANDREW SCHOTTER, THE ECONOMIC
THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1981)).
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and individuals subject to their decisions. New institutions, however, cannot
easily draw upon pre-existing modes of legitimacy (either political or
judicial), and need quickly to establish their own credibility base. Cohen and
Deason note that the public/private affiliation of an institution "is relevant to
its source of legitimacy, regulatory authority, and/or coercive ability."'I l l
They argue that government sponsorship can either increase legitimacy or
"detract from legitimacy by making it difficult to build trust."1 12 Where the
government and its agencies of enforcement (the police and criminal justice
system) have themselves been implicated in the conflict, the independence of
any regulatory authority is likely to be of paramount importance-at least,
until new structures become embedded and are able to attract cross-
community support. In this way, a regulatory body that incorporates dispute
resolution mechanisms, situated independently between civil society and the
institutions of government, can serve a mediating role. This triangulation
prevents the new dispute resolution body from being tainted by the legacy of
partisanship, provides a forum for greater civil society involvement in
decisions (potentially contributing to dialogue about underlying contested
values), and enables the fledgling structures of the (here, transitional) polity
to develop stronger roots.
A second means of enhancing the persuasive authority of an institution,
however, is to include representation from the competing factions upon it.
This approach is a central tenet of the doctrine of consociationalism.l1 3 Aside
from the essentializing nature of any representativeness requirement, it is
unclear whether consociational theory requires that group representation be
prioritized in all public institutions, however distanced from central
government."14 Erik Luna favors the checks and balances provided by
"institutionalized 'devil's advocacy' with an appointed individual or group
required to present opposing viewpoints." ' 1 5 Similarly, John McGarry and
Brendan O'Leary maintain that "[i]nclusion in power-sharing coalitions .
111 Cohen & Deason, supra note 3, at 16.
112 Id. at 16.
113 Consociationalism, first formulated by Arend Lijphart, is a form of multi-ethnic
power sharing often regarded as suitable for societies riven by identity-based conflict. See
AREND LuPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (Yale University Press 1977).
114 George Monbiot notes the phenomenon of "photocopy democracy" whereby at
each stage of removal--each copy--"democracy becomes greyer and harder to
decipher." GEORGE MONBIOT, THE AGE OF CONSENT: A MANIFESTO FOR A NEW WORLD
ORDER 48 (2003).
115 Erik Luna, Race, Crime and Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
183, 198 (2003) (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Physcology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 592-93, 596-600 (2002).
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can make radicals less extreme, because it provides them with opportunities
to have their concerns addressed constitutionally, and gives them a stake in
the system. Inclusion can strengthen the position of moderates within radical
factions ... . 16 Brian Barry, though, is less enthusiastic about the capacity
of such arrangements to deliver consensual bargaining. Barry suggests that
"[w]hat we might find out by experience is that institutionalizing group
representation offers opportunities and incentives for political entrepreneurs
to whip up intragroup solidarity and intergroup hostility in the pursuit of
power."117
The North Report recommended that the Parades Commission be both
independent and representative. The independence of the Commission was to
be "given an appropriate statutory basis." 1 8 The PPA, however, makes no
reference to the Commission's "independence," and there is room for debate
about how independent from government the body ought to be. 119 On the one
1 1 6 JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT:
CONSOCIATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS 25 (Oxford University Press 2004).
117 Brian Barry, Second Thoughts-and Some First Thoughts Revived, in
MULTICULTURALISM RECONSIDERED: CULTURE AND EQUALITY AND ITS CRITICS 204, 211
(Paul Kelly ed., Polity Press 2002).
118 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 142. When it was established, it was
argued that the Commission should be categorized as an "independent statutory body"
(thus technically falling outside the remit of the Commissioner for Public Appointments).
This was confirmed in a letter from Mr. A.J, Howie (Machinery of Government and
Standards Group, Cabinet Office) to Mr. J.M. Steele (then Director of Policing and
Security, NIO) dated February 11, 1997 (on file with authors). The letter stated:
[T]he Commission will have a unique role, and may have decision-making and
ombudsman-type powers, which makes it difficult to fit neatly into any one
category. Moreover, it will presumably need to be seen to be as independent from
Government as possible. We therefore suggest that ... the Commission should be
set up as an independent statutory body.
Letter from A.J. Howie to J.M. Steele (Feb. 11, 1997). The Commission, though, is now
recognized as a "Tribunal Non-Departmental Public Body." Application of John Joseph
Duffy for Judicial Review [2006] NIQB 29 (N. Ir.) (referencing the judge's statements at
paragraph four regarding the content of affidavits submitted by the Parades Commission).
A "Tribunal Non-Departmental Public Body" is one that operates "with jurisdiction in a
specialised field of the law, independently of Government, usually concerned with the
rights and obligations of individuals towards a branch of Government or other public
authority relating to specialist areas of the law." See SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, REVIEW OF
COMMON POLICE SERVICES at 2: CPSP.PB(4.5)E--GOVERNANE-STRUCTURAL
MODELS, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/Police/17558/Structural
Models (defining "Tribunal Non-Departmental Public Body).
119 The independence of the Commission is potentially compromised by the
Secretary of State's residual powers to regulate public processions and related protests.
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hand, the Commission could become more tribunal like, with, for example,
appointments being made by the Lord Chancellor. Alternatively, the
Commission could become a more democratic body, with closer links to the
Northern Ireland Assembly. According to the latter model, agreements
reached between local political representatives would then be "sold" to their
respective constituents. As it stands, the Commission is "a mongrel-not
quite judicial, not really democratic."' 120 Consequently, at least in part, "the
Parades Commission has to measure its success by the ability of the police to
manage public order."'1 21
The only stipulation in relation to the membership of the Commission is
contained in Schedule 1, paragraph 2(3) of the PPA, which requires the
secretary of state, in making the appointments, "to ensure that as far as is
practicable the membership of the Commission is representative of the
community in Northern Ireland." The government's hope, therefore, seems to
have been that the Commission, despite being non-elected, would gain its
legitimacy from being broadly representative of the community. The
Commission was initially comprised of a chairman, four other
commissioners, and a staff of civil servants. 122 Although broadly welcomed
within the Catholic community (despite continued suspicion of excessive
police influence), it was rejected from the outset by many Unionists
(including the Orange Order, who still refuse to engage with the
Commission). 123  Indeed, the purported "representativeness" of the
The Secretary of State can ban an individual parade, or all parades in a particular area, for
a period not exceeding twenty-eight days (s.1 1, Party Processions (NI) Act 1998). While
these powers have not yet been exercised, only the fact that the Commission's
determinations are subject to independent judicial review would appear to confirm its
compliance with the test of "independence and impartiality" contained in Article 6(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)--the right to a fair trial. There is,
though, some doubt as to whether Article 6 of the ECHR applies to the adjudicatory role
of the Parades Commission. See MICHAEL HAMILTON, NEIL JARMAN & DOMINIC BRYAN,
PARADES PROTESTS AND POLICING: A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 35-40 (2001),
available at http://www.nihrc.org/dms/data/NIHRC/attachments/dd/files/24/parades_poli
cing.doc.
120 Dominic Bryan, Is the Parades Commission on the Right Route? Or Public
Perceptions of a Mongrel 3 (February 22, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
121 Id. at 6.
122 The Commission's first Chairman was Alistair Graham, with David Hewitt,
Frank Guckian, Rev. Roy Magee, and Bema Mclvor as Commissioners.
123 See Parades Policy Decision Deferred, BBC NEWS, Feb. 18, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northemireland/4724332.stm. This was despite the
appointment of two Orangemen (David Burrows and Donald McKay) as Commissioners
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Commission has three times been challenged in the High Court in Belfast
(ironically perhaps, by Nationalist residents on each occasion).
In February 1998, the then Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam, appointed
four new members-two Protestants and two Catholics. One of the
Protestants was a leading member of the Apprentice Boys, and the other was
best known for his role in the 1974 Loyalist workers' strike which collapsed
the fledgling power-sharing executive.1 24 The two Catholic appointees were
a barrister and former member of the Police Authority, and a senior partner
in a Belfast solicitor's practice. 125 These appointments were challenged by a
resident of the lower Ormeau Road in the case of In the Matter of an
Application for Judicial Review by Jane Elizabeth Armstrong.126 It was
argued, on behalf of the applicant, that the appointees were "non-nationalist
Catholics" and thus failed to provide an adequate counterbalance to the
grassroots Loyalist appointees.' 27 In other words, it was suggested that the
Catholic appointees were not "representative" of the (grassroots) community
which they appeared to have been selected to represent. While the
application was ultimately unsuccessful, the case raised the vital question of
whether the term "representative" implied that the Commission should be an
exact mirror-image of society on political, religious, gender, or geographical
grounds. The judge held (in relation to the two Catholic appointees) that
representativeness was not necessarily achieved by choosing candidates to be
pitted against one another. Rather, candidates should be representative of "a
in January 2006. Donald McKay has since resigned from the Parades Commission, and
David Burrows from the Orange Order.
124 Tommy Cheevers and Glenn Barr respectively.
125 Rose-Anne McCormick and Aidan Canavan respectively. In March 1998, the
Commission published, and distributed to every household in Northern Ireland, an
information leaflet entitled "nho do they think they are?" The leaflet outlined the main
tasks of the Commission and provided background information about each of the newly
appointed Commissioners. The four new appointees joined the two remaining
Commissioners, David Hewitt (a solicitor, former Independent Assessor of Military
Complaints and founding member of the Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland,
ECONI) and Frank Guckian (then Director of Londonderry Chamber of Commerce and a
past Chief Commissioner of the Planning Appeals Commission), and the Commission
Chairman, Alistair Graham (Chief Executive of the Leeds Training and Enterprise
Council, and a former trade union leader and Director of the Industrial Society).
126 Notes from the Hearing, In the Matter of an Application for Judicial Review by
Jane Elizabeth Armstrong, [1998] NIQB (on file with authors). This information is based
on notes taken by Michael Hamilton on the 3d and 29th of April during the hearing.
127 Id.
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wide spectrum and broad diversity."' 128 Secondly, even if those two
appointments did fail to provide an adequate counterbalance to the Loyalist
appointees, that did not disqualify them from being representative of the
broader community of Northern Ireland. 129
In February 2000, the appointment of an all-male Commission (with only
one former member being reappointed) 130 again raised the question of
"representativeness." The appointments were challenged by a resident from
the Garvaghy Road in Portadown in another judicial review hearing-In the
Matter of an Application for Judicial Review by Evelyn White. 131 In the
course of this hearing, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) argued that "the
parades or marching issue is primarily an issue which engages the sectarian
division within Northern Ireland. It is that division which, in a body as small
as the Commission, must be the principal focus of the Secretary of State in
making appointments to it."' 132 Lord Chief Justice Carswell stated that he was
"not altogether persuaded that the phrase 'representative of the
community' ... was intended to mean that there should be gender balance, or
at least some representation of each gender in the make-up of the
Commission." 133 Moreover, he concluded that because it was not practicable
to appoint a woman to the Commission in the circumstances, it was
unnecessary to decide the question of whether the PPA imposed a
requirement only to ensure sectarian balance in the composition of the
Commission.
128 Notes from the Hearing, In the Matter of an Application for Judicial Review by
Jane Elizabeth Armstrong, [1998] NIQB. This information is based on notes taken by
Michael Hamilton on the 29th of April 1998 during the hearing (on file with authors).
129 This contradicts paragraph twenty-six of the affidavit of Mr. John Steele, in
which he states: "Mrs. McCormick, together with the other member appointed, is
representative of the minority part of the community in Northern Ireland." Steele Aff.
26 (on file with the authors).
130 William Martin was the only Commissioner to retain his post on the
Commission, raising questions about the need for some level of continuity in the
Commission's membership (a point touched upon in the REPORT OF THE REVIEW OF THE
PARADES COMMISSION AND PUBLIC PROCESSIONS (NI) ACT 1998, at 10.2(u), 21.24
(2002) [hereinafter, THE QUIGLEY REPORT].
131 In the Matter of an Application for Judicial Review by Evelyn White [2000]
NIQB (N. Ir.).
132 Watkins Aff. 17 (on file with the authors).
133 In the Matter of an Application by Evelyn White for Judicial Review [2000]
NIQB 2085 (N. Ir.).
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Another judicial review was mounted against the NIO's appointment of
two Orangemen to the Commission in January 2006;134 however, like both
the Armstrong and White cases, they were unsuccessful. In this hearing, Lord
Chief Justice Kerr considered "that the balance dimension to
representativeness on the Commission must, as a matter of practical reality,
be confined to the representation of both sides of the community of Northern
Ireland. To apply a requirement of balance beyond that would create an
impossible hurdle."' 135 Noting that the conflict of interest "is both inescapable
and obvious,"' 36 Kerr LCJ foresaw "considerable difficulties in Mr. Burrows
taking part in many of the critical determinations of the Commission."'137
Consequently, David Burrows resigned from the Orange Order and agreed
not to take part in any Parades Commission decisions relating to parades in
Portadown.
The appointment of "grassroots" Loyalists in both 1998 and 2006 was an
attempt by the government to assuage Unionist/Loyalist anger and so avoid
another "Drumcree 1996" or "Whiterock 2005." As Larry Diamond notes, "a
concrete way that institutional design can mitigate the obstacles to
democratic consolidation is by discouraging politically significant groups
from becoming disloyal or even equivocal in their commitment to the
system."' 38  However, there is clearly a potential clash between
representativeness and independence-those who represent warring political
identities cannot, at the same time, be viewed as truly independent. Thus, if
"representative" is understood to mean directly representative of the parties
to a dispute, clear conflict of interest issues arise. On this basis, we suggest
that the representativeness criterion should be relegated to a secondary
consideration, while greater attention should be devoted to factors which
would demonstrably secure the independence of the body. That is not to say
that broad representativeness on (at least) political, religious, cultural, and
134 In the Matter of an Application by John Joseph Duffy for Judicial Review [2006]
NIQB 29 (N. Ir.); see also In the Matter of an Application by John Joseph Duffy for
Judicial Review [2006] NICA 28 (Civ) (N. Ir.).
135 In the Matter of an Application by John Joseph Duffy for Judicial Review [2006]
NICA 28 (Civ) (N. Ir.), Judgment of Kerr LCJ at para. 17.
136 Id. at para. 31. Morgan J had earlier stated in the High Court that "the notion of a
body which is representative of the community in Northern Ireland encompasses not just
diversity but also the concept of balance." In the Matter of an Application by John Joseph
Duffy for Judicial Review [2006] NIQB 31 (Civ) (N. Ir.) at para. 18.
137 In the Matter of an Application by John Joseph Duffy for Judicial Review [2006]
NICA 28 (Civ) (N. fr.) at para.35.
138 LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 104
(The John Hopkins University Press 1999).
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gender grounds should not be encouraged, merely that, unless the balance of
distaste is shared equally across the communal divide, efforts to increase
grassroots representation are likely to undermine the body and distract from
efforts to resolve the substantive issues. Indeed, there is little evidence from
the Parades Commission case study to suggest that the institutional inclusion
of antagonistic perspectives translates into greater inclusion or tolerance
within the wider community. This scenario is described by Manlio Cinalli as
"pillarisation"-where "majority and minority communities find full
representation in the institutional framework, but only form loose ties with
one another. . . -139 It is argued that the Parades Commission's legitimacy
ought ultimately to derive from its proficiency in decisionmaking and, more
specifically, its framing of the valid interests at stake and facilitation of
bargaining processes.
B. Framing and Bargaining Processes
The Commission is a hybrid body performing a dual function-issuing
determinations with respect to particular proposed public processions 140 (the
adjudication function) carried out by state-appointed commissioners and
"facilitating mediation"' 41 (the mediation function) undertaken by contracted
Authorized Officers (AOs). The Commission imposes (vertical/hierarchical)
decisions in situations where agreed local (horizontal) accommodations
between stakeholders cannot be reached (even following intervention by the
AOs or other mediators). There is nothing in the PPA which prescribes how
the relationship between the adjudicatory and mediative functions of the
Parades Commission should work in practice, and there has long been a
tension between these two elements. Moreover, these two functions have
each presented different opportunities for clarifying the interests at stake and
for articulating principles which might provide the basis for consensual
resolution. They do not, therefore, map straightforwardly onto the procedural
roles of dispute resolution outlined in Part I-first, a pre- or extra-dialogical
process which frames the dispute and seeks to establish defined parameters
and, second, a communicative bargaining process that takes place within
139 Cinalli, supra note 9, at 178.
140 See Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998, c. 2, § 2(2)(b).
141 Section 2(2)(a) of the Public Processions Act provides that the Commission may
"facilitate mediation between parties to particular disputes concerning proposed public
processions and take such other steps as appear... to be appropriate for resolving such
disputes." Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998, c. 2, § 2(2)(a).
160
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these boundaries. It is the institutional design features that facilitate the
framing of and bargaining over contested parades to which we now turn.
1. Framing Parade Disputes
a. The Institutional Remit
Parade disputes are a microcosm of Northern Ireland's wider political
conflict and are intrinsically bound up with the nature of its "conflicted
democracy."' 142 Given their totemic significance, the intensity of such
disputes has reflected the prevailing political climate, and they have provided
a vehicle through which other issues have been dramatized and played out.
Efforts to find a resolution have thus been viewed either as contingent upon
agreement on policing and political structures, or as a necessary precursor to
macropolitical progress. This is typical of identity-based conflicts where it is
often impossible to disaggregate the disputed issues. In turn, this leads to
brinkmanship on the basis that "nothing can be agreed until everything is
agreed"-a dynamic that partly explains why this intractable issue was
siphoned off from the peace negotiations. However, it raises the design
problem of how to frame the remit of an institution intended to respond to a
particular problem. A body with a limited role might always be captive to
wider political developments, while a body with a broad remit might simply
become a surrogate for political negotiations writ small. On the one hand, a
narrow remit can give clarity and purpose. On the other, it can lead to a false
compartmentalization of the conflict. Moreover, such design decisions
inevitably affect the type and scope of possible interventions.
In Northern Ireland, the parades-specific remit of the North Review was
critiqued for being too narrow-it was argued that parades were but one
manifestation of the wider question of territoriality and the issue of sharing
public space. 143 Subsequently, this narrow focus presented difficulties for
some of the Commission's AOs. On occasion, AOs felt unable to intervene
until a specific parades problem arose despite the escalation of local tensions
142 See also Fionnuala Ni Aolhin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of Transition in
Conflicted Democracies, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 172 (2005). The authors distinguish post-
conflict peace transitions from post-revolutionary democratic transitions and argue that
transitions in "conflicted democracies," id. at 176, are not characterized solely by the
supersession of violence by peace, but also involve "a deepening of substantive
democracy," id. at 179.
143 See BRENDAN MURTAGH, COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT IN RURAL ULSTER 56
(1999).
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concerning other issues around the use of public space (such as flag disputes
or ongoing interface issues). This in turn created a perception amongst local
community workers and other agencies that the AOs were "parachuted" into
an area and that they were not sufficiently aware of local sensitivities or the
nuances of other initiatives. 144
In addition, one of five critical success factors devised by the review
team, against which they sought to test their proposals, was that "any new
arrangements should lead.., where practical, to achieving an
accommodation for parades in individual locations over a longer time
frame."'145 Therefore, it was proposed that in order to improve the prospects
for local agreement, the Parades Commission "should take a broad overview
of the number and nature of parades in a particular area, ideally on a
timescale of a year or more, rather than just considering individual parades,
one at a time. The latter is a recipe for maintaining a win-lose
perspective."' 146 The Quigley Report similarly recommended that the
adjudicatory body should be able to impose determinations which would
stand for up to five years, 147 but this recommendation has not been
implemented-presumably because it would risk glossing over the specific
interests and rights issues raised in individual situations.
If the conflict is more broadly defined, that may open up possibilities for
more relevant, timely, and coordinated interventions. Equally, though, the
adjudicatory function of the Commission necessarily has a narrow focus
given the esoteric nature of the issues raised by public processions. If, as we
suggest, institutionalized devices of framing and bargaining can shift
disputants from their entrenched positions in relation to one specific issue, by
doing so, such processes can spur agreement on other issues. This
progressive dynamic of conflict resolution impels the modification of newly
144 One possibility for reform would be for the mediative function of the Parades
Commission to have a more broadly cast focus than at present, touching on other issues
pertaining to shared space. As recommended in recent research conducted for the Office
of the First and Deputy First Minister, there is a need to "[d]evelop a more co-ordinated
approach to management of conflict and conflict transformation through the use of
dedicated fieldworkers." Dominic Bryan & Gordon Gillespie, Transforming Conflict:
Flags and Emblems, BELFAST: INSTITUTE OF IRISH STUDIES 1 7.37 (2005). This could be
achieved by broadening the remit of the AOs and locating them outside the Parades
Commission (possibly, for example, within the Community Relations Council). This,
though, would entail changes to other aspects of the Commission's work-particularly in
relation to its evidence gathering mechanisms.
145 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 129 (emphasis added).
146 Id. at 160-61.
147 THE QUIGLEY REPORT, supra note 131, at 246.
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dissonant and contradictory stances, as well as providing a stable basis for
expanding relations of recognition between disputants.148 The example of the
Parades Commission-as we discuss further below-clearly evidences the
potential for an institution with a narrowly framed remit to incentivize
broader processes of democratic consolidation.
b. Participation and Procedural Transparency
Acknowledging past structural deficiencies, the North Report critiqued
the police regulation of parade disputes on the basis that there was "no
explicit opportunity for the consideration of the views of local residents,
other than through the threat of protest."' 149 Drawing upon the arrangements
for dealing with contentious parades in South Africa (emphasizing the
importance of wide involvement and prior negotiations), 150 the report
recommended that the Commission "should be free to take such steps as it
thinks appropriate to obtain the views of all interested parties."' 51 While
arguing that there may be occasions when the Commission felt it necessary
to obtain views in confidence (because "intimidation and community
pressures are realities in Northern Ireland"), 152 the review team left open the
possibility that the "Commission may, however, wish to have more than one
group present at the same time, thereby allowing interested parties to hear the
points others are making, both in order to understand their position better and
to be able to take their views into account. 153
The review team also argued that "a Code of Conduct should be
introduced covering the behavior of both participants in a parade and of
protesters" for this "would buttress the right to peaceful assembly and
evidence respect for the views of others."' 5 4 Given that "a code is of little
value if it is not applied,"' 155 the North Report recommended that the Parades
Commission "should be required to address the question of monitors," 156 and
that in considering any parade proposal, the Commission should have regard
148 See AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL GRAMMAR
OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 170 (1995).
149 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 134.
150 id. at 106-07.
151 Id. at 159.
152 Id. at 160.
153 Id.
!154 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 181.
155 Id. at 187.
156 Id. at 187.
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for "any evidence of previous breaches of the Commission's or of an
approved Code of Conduct, whether by participants or protesters."' 157
The Commission has largely followed these recommendations. Interested
parties to specific disputes (including the police) are invited to meet with the
Commission to explain their concerns and discuss the options available.
Furthermore, the internal review procedures (under paragraph 6 of the
Procedural Rules)158 provide a forum for parties to correct any factual
inaccuracies in a Commission determination or to present new evidence that
might merit the Commission's reconsideration of an earlier decision. In
addition, a team of approximately thirty volunteer monitors have been
recruited and trained, and these monitors submit factual reports to the
Commission about parades they have observed. Importantly, the Commission
also receives reports from its team of twelve AOs. AOs are self-employed
(i.e., they are not employees of the Commission but are paid by the
Commission) and work in teams of two (balanced, where possible, in terms
of gender and religion) in designated areas across Northern Ireland. Their
main responsibilities are:
(a) gathering information about parades and the areas in which they are
held and reporting to the Commission accordingly;
(b) making contact and building relationships with local groups and
individuals, including parade organisers and residents' associations;
(c) helping the Commission to communicate with specified parties by
disseminating information from the Commission, including, where
appropriate, serving determinations in respect of particular parades;
(d) taking steps to secure local accommodation in relation to parade
disputes, including the more long term approach of community
development which seeks to promote and support community
activity to build the potential for local accommodation;
(e) reporting to the Commission the potential for such accommodation;
(f) engaging with community groups in an educational process about the
Parades Commission, how it operates, the extent of its powers and
decision making process;
(g) reporting to the Commission in the aftermath of contentious parades
on how the parade was conducted. The AOs' report informs the
Commission's future decisions on that parade in relation to
164
157 Id. at 188.
158 PARADES COMM'N, PROCEDURAL RULES 6 (2005) available at,
http://www.paradescommission.org/publications/PDF/AC440D.pdf.
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compliance with the conditions of any determination issued in
relation to it, and with its Code of Conduct. 159
The Commission's Procedural Rules provide that the AOs will act on the
Commission's behalf in gathering information, 160 will be party to
confidential evidence, 16 1 and will also report to the Commission on the
potential for achieving local accommodation "and on any steps taken towards
securing accommodation by the parties to a dispute."' 162 Their reports might
outline a number of options for the Commission to consider. Indeed, AOs are
sometimes invited (or may themselves request an opportunity) to brief
commissioners on recent and potential developments in particular locations.
They do not, however, sit in on Commission meetings.
It has been argued that the Commission would become detached if it
were not party to the flow of information provided by the AOs. The Northern
Ireland Affairs Committee, for example, stated that one role of the AOs was
to provide "an essential conduit of information between the two communities
and the Parades Commission" without which "the work of the Commission
would be seriously impaired."' 163 Indeed, it "is difficult to see how the
Parades Commission could be properly informed in the absence of the
reports of the Authorised Officers."' 164
As will become clear when we discuss the bargaining processes enabled
by the Commission (below), this reporting function of the AOs does
compromise their ability to mediate disputes. There have also been some
accusations that the Parades Commission is a "factory of grievances,"' 165 and
despite these multiple channels, the Commission has sometimes been
criticized for existing in an "ivory tower."' 166 Nonetheless, we believe that it
largely conforms to Goodin's reflective model of institutional responsiveness
where the inclusivity and quality of inputs matters, and parties' arguments
159 PARADES COMM'N SECOND ANN. REP. 1999-2000, at 21-22 (2000).
160 PARADES COMM'N PROCEDURAL RULES 2.2 (2002).
161 Id. 3.3.
162 Id. 4.3.
163 See N. It. AFFAIRS COMM., THE PARADES COMMISSION AND PUBLIC
PROCESSIONS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT, 1998, H.C. 172-I, 80 (2005).
164 Id. 76, at 26.
165 Memorandum submitted by the Independent Loyal Orange Institution, in N. IR.
AFFAIRS COMM., THE PARADES COMMISSION, H.C. 120-I1, Appendix 2 at 190, 191
(2000-01).
166 N. IR. AFFAIRS COMM., THE PARADES COMMISSION AND PUBLIC PROCESSIONS
(NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1998, 2004-5, H.C. 172-I (Oral and Written Evidence) at Ev.
23, Answer by Mr Alistair Simpson to Q.80 (Mr Luke).
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and reasons are explored rather than merely their "bottom line."'1 67 There is,
however, some room for improvement. One important aspect of the
predialogic process which has arguably been frustrated by the Commission's
procedures is the free-flow of information between parties-in other words,
the degree to which parties are informed of other parties' concerns or
objections. Rule 3.3 of the Commission's Procedural Rules states:
All evidence provided to the Commission, both oral and written, will be
treated as confidential and only for the use of the Commission, those
employed by the Commission and Authorised Officers. The Commission,
however, reserves the right to express unattributed general views heard in
evidence [but only as part of an explanation of its decision]. 16 8
This rule has proved to be a substantial obstacle in promoting a truly
communicative approach in the operation of the Commission. 169 There is a
strong argument that by making all representations to the Commission
available to all parties, disingenuous or fallacious representations would be
discouraged. If disclosure might pose a safety risk to individuals, summaries
of representations might instead be published, omitting any details that could
identify the source of the information. Improving transparency in this way
would have one of two consequences. It could serve to "out" indefensible
arguments, whereupon parties would be subject to ridicule or criticism.
Alternatively, parties might attempt to preempt potential criticism by
"window-dressing" their arguments so as to give an appearance of
reasonableness. As Habermas notes, "concealing publicly indefensible
interests behind pretended moral or ethical reasons necessitates self-bindings
that either on the next occasion expose a proponent as inconsistent or, in the
interest of maintaining his credibility, lead to the inclusion of others'
interests. ' 170 Edward Weisband similarly envisages parties becoming
"entrapped in a process of 'self-hostaging' on the basis that "[s]hame exists
167 GOODIN, supra note 14, at 16.
168 PARADES COMM'N, PROCEDURAL RULES 3.3 (2005) (emphasis added).
169 The principles governing discovery of confidential documents in the course of
judicial review proceedings-where proportionality is in issue in the substantive
application-are the subject of Tweed v. Parades Commission for Northern Ireland
(presented to the House of Lords on December 12, 2005 and set for hearing on March 6,
2006; judgment awaited). This is an appeal from In the Matter of An Application by
David Tweed on his own behalf and on behalf of all other Members of Dunloy LOL 496,
for Judicial Review [2005] NICA 42 (Civ) (N. Ir.).
170 HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 340.
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in a world of honor, even if it is honor among thieves."' 171 While parties
might not always be concerned about their public image or reputation, in
identity-based conflict, parties rarely want to be perceived as the spoilers.
This is particularly so where the dynamics and outcomes of individual
disputes can affect the bargaining strengths of the broader constituencies
(Loyalist or Republican) in the political process. Thus, while "taking the
moral high-ground" may be a euphemism for one party attempting to prove
itself better than the other, procedural traosparency can serve to create a de-
escalatory spiral in which parties compete to demonstrate their bona fides.
Moreover, when parties do hear the objections raised by others, they are then
in a position to address or challenge the concerns raised. This advances the
prospect for resolution in local situations, ultimately reducing the number of
determinations which the Commission need issue.
c. Community Relations and Human Rights
Conceptualizing the Conflict
The Parades Commission is a laudable attempt to think through one of
Northern Ireland's toughest public order issues; it is also an "interesting
prototype" for public order decision making more generally. However, the
Commission will still need to address the question of why freedom of
assembly "is valued and the role and function it plays, or should play, in
Northern Ireland," in particular "how should freedom of assembly be
defined and applied in order to bring about a more tolerant society based on
equality and parity of esteem." 172
As we have suggested, both the institutional remit and the procedures
adopted by the Commission impact the way in which the conflict is framed.
Just as importantly, though, is the way in which the institution itself
conceives of the dispute and articulates its core principles. Furthermore, as
Stulberg notes, "[p]rovisions of positive law are often relevant to shaping the
conversation and visions regarding what parties want or are willing to agree
to in negotiation."1 73 In this light, the North Report stressed "the need for
171 Edward Weisband, Verdictive Discourses, Shame and Judicialization in Pursuit
of Freedom of Association Rights, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 134,
138 (Saladin Meckled-Garcia & Basak Cali eds., 2006).
172 NOEL WHITTY, THtRESE MURPHY & STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE, CIVIL LIBERTIES
LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ERA 92 (2001). This echoes the point made by Imelda
McAuley. See McAuley supra note 38 at 55.
173 See Stulberg, supra note 15, at 538.
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statutory criteria which take a clearer account of the underlying rights and
responsibilities of all concerned"'174 and recommended that the criteria
themselves should be extended to include consideration of the "impact of the
parade on the relationships within the community."' 175 The PPA thus
extended the previous statutory criteria for determining whether conditions
should be imposed on a parade, and Section 8(6) of the PPA represents an
attempt to move away from decisions based solely on public order grounds.
It provides that the Commission shall have regard to:
(a) any public disorder or damage to property which may result from the
procession;
(b) any disruption to the life of the community which the procession
may cause;
(c) any impact which the procession may have on relationships within
the community;
(d) any failure of a person of a description specified in the guidelines to
comply with the Code of Conduct...; and
(e) the desirability of allowing a procession customarily held along a
particular route to be held along that route. 176
Casting the parades conflict more emphatically in terms of its potential to
undermine community relations was itself an acknowledgement that there are
legitimate interests at stake for each of the parties-recognition that it is not a
straightforward policing or public order issue. Moreover, it sought to remind
parties of the overarching and shared interest in improved inter-communal
relations. However, by introducing such broadly defined harms-less
amenable to assessment or measurement-the statutory framework has
arguably compromised the ability of the Commission to "clarify the public
interest." Criticizing this aspect of the North Report, Professor Tom Hadden
argued that "whoever is making decisions should be making those decisions
on the basis of a statutory code. There are some parts of North which appear
to suggest a much more discretionary decision on the part of the
[C]ommission."' 177 Subsequently, the Northern Ireland Community Relations
Council has been critical of the Commission's application of the criterion:
174 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 135; see also id. at 54 (discussing
concerns raised about the statutory criteria laid out by the RUC).
175 Id. at 158.
176 Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998, c. 2, § 8(6).
177 2 N. IR. FORUM FOR POLmCAL DIALOGUE, REVIEW OF THE PARADES ISSUE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 395 (1997), http://www.ni-forunmi/gov.uk/reports/cr9_v2.pdf
(referring to statements of Professor T. Hadden and Ms. A. Donnelly).
168
[Vol. 22:1 20061
MEDIATION OF CONTESTED PARADES IN NORTHERN IRELAND
"[T]here is no indication of how [the impact of a parade on community
relations] is monitored, either before or after the event, so that outcomes can
inform future decisions. Nor is there any indication of a base line used in the
setting ofjudgments." 178
Not only has there been a failure to establish benchmarks against which
the impact of a parade on community relations might be assessed, the
Commission's determinations have also failed to clearly enunciate the
boundaries of the human rights claims made by the parties. Despite the
conclusions of an internal NIO review of the Commission, that "acceptance
of the Commission's determinations could be further improved if the
reasoning behind them were set out in more detail,"1179 determinations simply
note that it is "from the perspective of the parade organiser" that "the
Convention rights engaged are those protected by Articles 9, and 10 and, in
particular, Article 11."180 Determinations also routinely state that "[t]hose
who live, work, shop, trade and carry on business in the affected locality
enjoy rights under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of the First
Protocol thereto." 181 No further attempt is made to assess the implications of
these rights in the particular situation, to rule on the validity of the parties'
rights claims, or to explain how any restrictions imposed either relate to or
address the rights issues raised. While the Commission's determinations
arguably comply with the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), 182 they do so largely because the ECHR jurisprudence itself permits
a relatively wide "margin of appreciation" as to how signatory States fulfill
their Convention obligations (an issue which we discuss in greater detail
178e SUBMISSION TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON THE REVIEW OF THE
PARADES COMMISSION FROM COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL, in N. IR. AFFAIRS
COMM., THE PARADES COMMISSION, H.C. 120-I1, at 210 (2000-01).
179 Id. at 86.
1 8 0 See, e.g., PARADES COMM'N, DETERMINATION IN RELATION TO THE
BALLYMACARRETT DISTRICT LOL No. 6 PARADE NOTIFIED TO TAKE PLACE IN BELFAST
ON SUNDAY 29 OCTOBER 2006 at par. 11, available at
http://www.paradescommission.org/parades/.
181 Id. at para. 12. Keir Starmer and Jane Gordon provide a similarly anodyne
account of the rights potentially engaged in their REPORT ON THE POLICING OF THE 12TH
JULY ARDOYNE PARADES 10 (2004), available at
http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/word-docs/PDFs/ardoyne_parades.pdf.
182 The decisions of all public authorities must comply with the Human Rights Act
1998 which incorporated the ECHR into domestic law, and which came into force in
October 2000.
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elsewhere). 183 Against this backdrop, the timidity of the Parades Commission
in not explicitly ruling on the validity of the parties' rights claims 184 allows
the vocabulary of rights to be used rhetorically in defense of entrenched
positions. The Commission has not therefore maximized the utility of a rights
discourse to frame parade disputes in such a way as to level the playing field
and render disputants more amenable to the procedural devices of
communicative action. Any bargaining processes built on this imperfect pre-
dialogic groundwork are disadvantaged as a result. As Michelle Parlevliet
argues: "Conflict management must take place within a framework in which
human rights are nonnegotiable. While there is much scope for dialogue,
negotiation, and accommodation within that framework, practitioners must
be aware of its parameters in order to ensure that their interventions are in
line with fundamental rights and freedoms."'1 85
Ostensibly, this constructed model of dialogue challenges the classic
mediation paradigm in which parties themselves decide the issues and set the
agenda. In actuality, though, it is not that far removed from the elicitive
model. The framing process implicitly draws upon the representations that
parties themselves make to the Commission. Its aim is simply to settle
background issues and establish a minimum consensus (with reference to
external norms such as international human rights law) and thus focus parties
on, and ensure a common understanding of, the core political problem. This
pre- or extra-dialogical process is necessary given Rosenfeld's argument (in
Part I above) that parties sometimes hold such incompatible perspectives that
they are likely to be resistant to the procedural devices of communicative
action. 186 In order for dispute resolution mechanisms to serve a triangulating
role in democratic consolidation (mediating between state institutions/public
policy and underlying cultural values), we suggest that bargaining processes
must first agree on the margins of the conflict. This framing can equalize
bargaining positions and ensure a common starting point, yet it leaves open
much scope for dialogue about how best to resolve the contested issue. As
Parlevliet states, "whereas basic human needs are not negotiable, the possible
183 See MICHAEL HAMILTON, NEIL JARMAN & DOMINIC BRYAN, PARADES, PROTESTS
AND POLICING: A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 19-20 (2001), available at
http://www.nihrc.org/dms/data/NIHRC/attachments/dd/files/24/parades-policing.doc.
184 For example, in relation to what constitutes "peaceful assembly" or in relation to
the precise circumstances when "the right to private and family life" would actually be
engaged on the part of local residents in the vicinity of a parade.
185 Michelle Parlevliet, Bridging the Divide: Exploring the Relationship Between
Human Rights and Conflict Management, 11:1 TRACK Two (2002), available at
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/1 l_l/bridging.html.
186 See discussion supra Part L
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satisfiers are, and these will vary depending on the context .... Similarly,
fundamental rights and freedoms are not negotiable, but the manner in which
they are recognised is indeed negotiable."' 87 We suggested at the outset that
institutional design decisions could affect whether parties engaged
communicatively or merely strategically. The following section examines the
mechanisms instituted to provide opportunities for parties to parade disputes
to generate "possible satisfiers," critiquing them against this Habermasian
standard of ideal communication.
2. Bargaining Processes
Despite the fact that direct dialogue between parties to parade disputes
has occurred in very few situations, the Parades Commission has attached
great weight to the concept of "engagement.' 188 Examination of this concept
illustrates the crossover between the two functions of the Commission
(adjudicative and mediative) and demonstrates both the benefits and
drawbacks of the Commission's hybrid design. In this section, we look more
closely at what the Commission means by engagement, how the Commission
has sought to bring about communicative dialogue through the work of the
AOs, and the implications of the AOs being linked to the adjudicatory body
for deepening democratic dialogue.
a. Engagement
In the surveys conducted for the North Review, an overwhelming eighty-
eight percent of respondents agreed that negotiated accommodation should
be sought where there was a dispute between marchers and residents. 189 The
North Review Team therefore attached a premium to the value of local
negotiations, assisted, if appropriate, by third party mediators. 190 Since its
187 Parlevliet supra note 85 (citing M.A. MAX-NEEF, ANTONIO ELIZALDE & MARTIN
HOPENHAYN, HUMAN SCALE DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTION, APPLICATION AND FURTHER
REFLECTIONS 16-28 (1991)). Jeremy Waldron similarly states that "[i]nterests are
complicated things. There are many ways in which a given interest can be served or
disserved, and we should not expect to find that only one of those ways is singled out and
made the subject matter of a duty." JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 1981-1991, at 212 (1993) (emphasis in original).
188 PARADES COMM'N SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, at 15-16 (2000).
189 NORTH REPORT supra note 62 at 82.
190 Id. at 82 (Noting that "[t]here was broad agreement between Catholic and
Protestant respondents, 97% of Catholics and 83% of Protestants agreeing that negotiated
accommodation should be sought in such circumstances.") The North Report identified
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inception, the Parades Commission has sought to encourage local agreements
so that, ultimately, no determinations need be issued. To this end, the concept
of engagement has occupied center stage in its assessment of the impact of a
parade on community relations:
We measure the impact [on relationships within the community]
through assessing whether there has been a genuine attempt to gain the
respect of the receiving community for such a parade through seeking
dialogue where views can be exchanged and any concerns about a parade
can be aired. The Commission has acknowledged that in some areas such
dialogue is problematic and it has therefore encouraged all the parties to
spare no effort in finding a mutually acceptable form of communication.
The Commission has described this process of dialogue as engagement and
it has stressed that, in proposing engagement to address legitimate concerns
about a parade or parades in a particular locality, it makes a distinction
between engaging and seeking permission. Engagement by either part
represents a real attempt to address the legitimate concerns of others, and a
preparedness to accommodate those concerns, where it is within their power
to do so. 19 1
Following requests for clearer guidance on what constitutes engagement,
the Commission outlined a number of additional "pointers":
Dialogue alone is not sufficient to demonstrate "engagement."
Dialogue must be sustained, substantive and genuine if it is to bear
fruit .... In genuine engagement, each party can be expected to:
* enter the process with no pre-conceived outcomes,
" listen to and try to understand the other's concerns,
" show respect to the other, by taking their concerns seriously,
five "key elements" which would ideally be present whenever mediation is being
considered: (1) a willingness between the parties concerned to communicate with each
other, either directly or indirectly; (2) the opportunity to start the process early; since trust
is a vital ingredient, beginning mediation and negotiations at the 11 th hour is not the best
way to proceed; (3) being prepared to devote sufficient time to the process, so that all
parties understand each other's position; (4) a willingness, not just to enter into
discussion, but also to reach a mutually agreed outcome; and (5) an ability, on the part of
the parties concerned, to speak with some authority on behalf of their respective groups
in the community. Id. at 143.
191 MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE PARADES COMMISSION, in NORTHERN
IRELAND AFFAIRS COMMITrEE, SECOND REPORT: THE PARADES COMMISSION, H.C. 120-
II, at 3 (2000-01), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/
cmselect/cmniaf/463/0050303.htm.
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* be willing to communicate their own legitimate concerns clearly,
* focus on issues that are capable of being addressed by the parties
concerned,
* demonstrate a commitment to resolving the problem and addressing
legitimate concerns, preferably within a target timetable,
* be represented by people with the authority to speak for the
protagonists, and
* demonstrate a willingness to consider some form of third party
intervention, such as mediation, if direct dialogue is not possible.
192
The Commission has linked the failure to engage with the rights issues at
stake-the fact that no engagement had taken place "may have negative
consequences in the context of the considerations which the Commission is
obliged to take into account and the various rights and interests at play."' 193
The Commission has also stated that dialogue is crucial in building "towards
a position of respect and thus ... towards embracing the diversity which we
all value."' 194 Yet the failure of the Commission to frame the rights issues
leaves these notions of respect and diversity afloat, compromising the
potential for engagement to cut to the nub of the dispute. Indeed, the concept
of "engagement" has proved extremely problematic. In some areas, it appears
to have been elevated into a precondition for future parades, 195 and the
Quigley Report in 2002 pointed to the fact "that ... nearly 6 years on, there
are still situations where there is no real engagement."' 196 The report argued
that:
192 PARADES COMM'N supra note 189.
193 Parades Comm'n, Belfast Walker Club ABOD Parade in Belfast (Apr. 1, 2002)
(unpublished determination, on file with authors).
194 Parades Comm'n, Belfast Walker Club ABOD Parade in Belfast (Nov. 9, 2002)
(unpublished determination, on file with authors).
195 The situation in the town of Dunloy perhaps provides the starkest example. See
also KELLY & NAN, supra note 55, at 35; Parades Comm'n, Consideration of Contentious
Parades and Determination Regarding Dunloy Apprentice Boys Church Parade (May 17,
1998) (unpublished determination, on file with authors); In the Matter of an Application
by David Tweed on his own Behalf and on Behalf of all Other Members of Dunloy LOL
496 for Judicial Review [2005] NICA 42 (Civ) (N. Ir.). In addition to challenging the
proportionality of the restrictions contained in the Commission's determinations of April
5 and 9, 2004, the applicant is seeking a declaration of incompatibility in respect of
Section 8(6)(c) of the PPA (the community relations criterion) on the basis that this is not
a legitimate aim in Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the ECHR for which restrictions on these
convention rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion; expression; and assembly
respectively) can be imposed.
196 THE QUIGLEY REPORT, supra note 131, at 145.
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* More could be done to explain why so much importance is attached
to engagement. 19 7
" More could be done to demonstrate what it is believed is being
achieved by engagement and thereby encourage increased effort. 198
* Given the charge of inconsistency.., the Commission might also
have made clearer how it applies the engagement factor and
why... the weight it has given to it or to particular manifestations
of engagement may have differed from case to case. 199
A perception exists that the Parades Commission continually moves the
goalposts of engagement, and that the Commission views unilateral
discussions between one party and its AOs merely as a precursor to mediated
and direct dialogue between the parties.200 This can create a chill factor-
belief that it might be better not to enter into discussions at all than to risk
either the negative connotations of later withdrawal or being pressured into
reaching a (strategically) unfavorable agreement. We suggest, therefore, that
where a party is reluctant to enter into a process of mediation, unilateral
discussions with the determining body might well be able to successfully
address and resolve many of the contentious issues (for example, by securing
commitments to improve stewarding arrangements at a parade). It should
therefore be emphasized that unilateral discussions need not necessarily be a
precursor to mediated dialogue between parties. Indeed, in some instances,
mediation might not be appropriate at all.
b. The Role of the Commission in Facilitating Mediation
As the Commission has argued, however, "the most basic form of human
respect is to be prepared to talk to someone." 20 1 Unilateral discussions with
the adjudicatory body cannot bring about expanded relations of recognition
and truly communicative dialogue with democracy deepening effects. In
197 Id. at 150.
19 8 Id. at 150-51.
199 Id. at 151.
200 See, e.g., In re McRoberts, No. WEAB4546T (NIQB, July 11, 2003) (N. Ir.) (on
file with authors). In this case, Counsel for the Commission argued that meetings between
a parade organizer and representatives of the Commission (Sept.-Dec. 2002) were a
precursor to engagement with residents and so could legitimately be viewed as
constituting engagement. Id. Counsel for the applicant, on the other hand, argued that
such unilateral meetings at a strategic level were "neither here nor there" and could not
possibly constitute engagement. Id.
201 PARADES COMM, FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002, at 14 (2002).
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relation to the design considerations that would best promote such dialogue,
the North Report argued that it was doubtful "whether the Parades
Commission itself would need to develop a professional mediation capability
amongst its own staff. Rather it should develop a register of groups and
individuals with expertise who can play a part in local 0discussions." 20 2 The
PPA thus states that the Commission has a duty to "facilitate mediation." 20 3
While we have already detailed the role of the AOs in gathering evidence,
the AOs also perform this key function of facilitating mediation. In the words
of one government minister, they are to "discharge the function of mediation
and get as closely engaged with the process as possible." 204 This role has
been invented over time as much as it has been designed. The AOs became
increasingly involved with negotiations immediately prior to, and during,
parades. 20 5 This became particularly important since many residents' groups
refused to deal directly with the police. In turn, the more the police began to
understand the position of the AOs, the more they realized that working with
them could assist in tactical de-escalatory decisionmaking on the ground.
That said, the ability of the AOs to undertake this role has been very much
dependent upon the particular situation and both the intervention techniques
of, and confidences in, individual AOs.
Having to negotiate impending crises and deal with short-term obstacles
has meant that the work of the AOs has, for the most part, been limited to
capacity-building with individual parties. The hope has been that this may
lead to later agreement between parties to enter into a process of mediation.
202 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 144. Contrary to this advice, however, the
Northern Ireland Office advocated that the power to mediate should be retained by the
commissioners themselves as a residual power, irrespective of whether or not it was
actually used. The Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Bill, Clause 2(2)(a) provided
that the Parades Commission may "mediate, or facilitate mediation .. " See also 305
PARE. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 1151, 1163 (arguing that the Parades Commission
should have power to mediate); HANSARD: HOUSE OF LORDS STANDING COMMITTEE B,
DEBATE ON 'FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION', 3d Sitting 75 (Jan. 20, 1998), available
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 199798/cmstand/b/st980120/am/80120s0
1.htm. During the 1997 "marching season," the newly appointed (but still non-
adjudicatory) Parades Commissioners were involved in mediation efforts in a number of
contentious locations including Bellaghy, see KELLY & NAN, supra note 68, at 33;
Derry/Londonderry, id. at 59-60; and Newtownbutler, id. at 46-48. The Revd. Roy
Magee's involvement in Newtownbutler culminated in a historic joint statement on July
11 signed by members of the Orange Order and Newtownbutler Area Residents'
Association. Id. at 47.
203 Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998, c.2, at § 2(1)(b).
204 305 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 1163.
205 This material draws upon confidential interviews conducted by the authors.
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The focus of the intervention, though, is on preparing the ground for such
long-term initiatives (in which the AOs themselves may have little direct
involvement). Consequently, the bulk of the work currently undertaken by
the AOs falls within the pre-dialogical category, and the existing mechanisms
for facilitating mediation have been more successful at enabling short-term
"fire-fighting" than at stimulating lasting local accommodation. This
weakness is reflected in the NIO's consultation on mediation measures for
parades, which states that the focus must now be shifted toward "how best to
facilitate mediation to achieve long term solutions." 20 6 While the pre-dialogic
role is important in its own right, we suggest that the full potential of the AO
role has been undermined by its links to the adjudicatory body. This linkage
has had implications for both the neutrality of the AOs and the
confidentiality of the bargaining process, which we discuss briefly below.
c. Neutrality and Confidentiality
One marker of intervener effectiveness, identified by Cohen and Deason,
is provided by the intervener's neutrality or the leverage they exert on a
process.20 7 It is significant that the AOs are not classed as employees of the
Parades Commission, but are rather self-employed (and were originally
managed by Mediation Network).20 8 Nonetheless, as we detailed earlier, the
AOs also act as evidence-gatherers, which inevitably creates a conflict of
interest with their role in facilitating mediation. Indeed, the AO's role has
developed in a way not envisaged by the North Report, which concluded
that:
[I]t would not be right to recommend that, as a matter of course, mediators
should report to the Parades Commission on the progress of local
discussions, as they could then be seen as an arm of the Parades
Commission and thus lose effectiveness. They should, however, report
success or failure within a set timescale. 209
In defense of the connection between the AOs and the Commission, it
could be argued that unless parties believe that they can influence the
206 Ian Pearson, Foreword to NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, MEDIATION MEASURES
FOR PARADES IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 3 (2005).
207 Cohen & Deason, supra note 3, at 30.
208 Now Mediation Northern Ireland, supra note 64; see also PARADES COMM'N,
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2002-03), available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/parade/pc/pcl90903ar.pdf.
209 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 144.
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outcome of the Commission's determination, they will perceive there to be
no benefit to engaging with the AOs, and will therefore not do so. On this
view, having AOs who report to the Commission provides an otherwise
absent incentive to engage. It also enhances the possibility of the
Commission arriving at a determination which is sensitive to the parties' real
interests. Without doubt, there have been instances where communication
between community workers, representatives of marching organizations and
the AOs has been instrumental in "negotiating" the particular restrictions
imposed by a Commission determination. Although the AOs may have been
unable to facilitate an agreement in a particular dispute, their closeness to the
situation on the ground has often allowed them to make pragmatic
suggestions to the Commission as to what restrictions:
* might, at least, be accepted by the parties even if they would never
publicly agree to such a compromise,
* what restrictions are likely to be the easiest to police, and
* what restrictions might increase the likelihood of an accommodation
being reached in the future?210
Indeed, determinations sometimes give effect to "done deals." More
often than not these deals have not been explicitly acknowledged in the
determination. In such cases, the determination essentially provides cover for
those who negotiated the deal, and who, by doing so, may have rendered
themselves vulnerable to attack from "hardliners" within their own
community. This may have been what Sir George Quigley had in mind when
he noted "the murky world of shadows in which the Authorised Officers
have to operate and by the labyrinthine complexity of the process."'211
However, this (apparently pragmatic) approach which relies on open lines of
communication between the mediative and adjudicatory branches of the
Commission, may ultimately stymie the capacity of the Commission to
deepen democratic dialogue. So long as private agreements are disguised as
determinations, they are less likely to become "normative referents which
shape the interpretation of bargaining strategies and future conduct. '212 It is
only when accommodations are openly acknowledged as accommodations
210 This material draws upon confidential interviews conducted by the authors.
211 THE QUIGLEY REPORT, supra note 131, at 144. Sir George went on to remark that
he had "been impressed by their 'feel' for local situations, the skill, ingenuity and
tenacity they bring to problem-solving and their complete dedication." Id.
212 Linda Mulcahy, The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea? A Critique of the Ability of
Community Mediation to Suppress and Facilitate Participation in Civil Life, 27 J.L.
Soc'Y 133, 146 (2000).
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that they can extrapolate to the wider community the positive experience of
inter-communal contact.
There are four further arguments against having the AOs report to the
Commission on any substantive discussions between disputants. First, it
leads to parties "talking to the Commission" through the AOs, rather than
genuinely searching for agreed long-term outcomes with one another.213
When parties engage simply to curry favor with the determining body, the
end goal remains to influence an imposed determination rather than to set
about reaching a lasting agreement. In terms of Habermasian communicative
action, parties remain engaged strategically rather than communicatively.214
As Joseph Stulberg argues, the danger is that such mediation will never be
taken seriously in its own right, being instead viewed merely as "a dress
rehearsal for trial. 215
Second, for the Commission, this translates into the problem of how to
take a decision before any facilitated process has run its course, and what
weight, if any, to place on exploratory or uncompleted talks. Often a decision
must be (vertically) imposed before any dialogic process has had the chance
to take root, let alone deliver local agreement, but the Commission's
determinations have the potential to destabilize or undermine ongoing
(horizontal) consensus-based processes. These cases are instances of what
Goodin terms "arrested convergence .- "we often have to take some joint
action well before information-pooling processes have played themselves
out."'216 The Commission has many times been faced with the dilemma of
having to decide at some point before or during a process of engagement
whether one or the other party has "done enough" to get "their way."
Commissioners have had to make a judgment on, for example, whether other
factors should trump the fact that no engagement has occurred,217 the
213 Indeed, there have been occasions in the past when the AOs have simply been
bypassed by parties who felt it more efficacious to speak directly to the Secretariat (who
were perceived as having greater leverage with the Commissioners).
214 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 18.
215 Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 909,
935 (1998).
216 GOODIN, supra note 14, at 79.
217 See, e.g., Parades Comm'n, Belfast Walker Club ABOD Parade in Belfast (Apr.
13, 1998) (unpublished determination, on file with authors) in which the Commission
stated that "some degree of time and a considerable degree of effort on the part of each of
the loyal orders concerned and on the part of local people" would be required before a
parade could take place in a peaceful atmosphere along the lower Ormeau Road. This
principle, however, was effectively nullified by the Commission's decision two months
later to allow a parade on July 13, despite no engagement having occurred. Parades
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sufficiency of unilateral steps taken by a parade organizer, 218 a declared
willingness to enter into dialogue in the future, 219 dialogue which does not
culminate in agreement,220 and dialogue from which one party withdraws for
purportedly extraneous reasons. 221 When participation in a mediation process
is seen to be "rewarded," parties are likely to enter a process only with a
view to outdoing others in a box-ticking exercise, and the outcome can only
be dissatisfaction on one side or the other. We suggest that only by
separating the two functions can the horizontal pre-dialogic work become
less susceptible to the impact of an unwelcome ruling from the Commission.
Third, as the above two arguments suggest, "encouraging" or
"incentivizing" mediation can easily distort the motives of parties. The view
of mediation implicit in this approach departs from the principle that
mediation should be voluntary. It falls far short of the "willingness ... to
reach a mutually agreed outcome," which the North Report identified as a
prerequisite for the initiation of a mediation process.222 Finally, the absence
of a "Chinese wall" between the AO's facilitation work and the
commissioner's adjudicatory function, tarnishes the concept of mediation and
discourages recourse to it as a tool of dispute resolution. 223 Parties to parade
disputes have, on occasion, requested assurances from the AOs that their
discussions will remain entirely confidential and will not be disclosed to the
Parades Commission.224 This derives from a fear that "anything you say may
Comm'n, Ballynafeigh District LOL No.10 (July 13, 1998) (unpublished determination,
on file with authors).
218 Parades Comm'n, Craigavon Protestant Boys Flute Band Parade in Lurgan
(May, 6, 2000) (unpublished determination, on file with authors); Parades Comm'n,
Castlederg Young Loyalist Flute Band in Castlederg (Apr. 18, 2001) (unpublished
determination, on file with authors); Parades Comm'n, Ligonial Walker Club ABOD
Parade in Belfast (July 12, 2003) (unpublished determination, on file with authors).
219 E.g., Parades Comm'n, Silver Plains Flute Band Parade in Ballycastle (Sept. 30,
2002) (unpublished determination, on file with authors). But cf Parades Comm'n,
Castlederg Young Loyalist Flute Band in Castlederg (Sept. 12, 2002) (unpublished
determination, on file with authors). This question is also directly relevant to the
sequencing of steps which seek to advance a local resolution.
220 E.g., Parades Comm'n, Burntollet Sons of Ulster Flute Band Parade in Claudy
(June 21, 2002) (unpublished determination, on file with authors).
221 E.g., Parades Comm'n, Belfast Walker Club ABOD Parade in Belfast (Apr. 16,
2001) (unpublished determination, on file with authors).
222 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 143.
223 These conclusions derive from confidential interviews conducted by the authors.
224 Id.
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be used in evidence against you."225 In other words, reluctance to enter a
process of mediation might be prompted by anxiety that anything said during
the process might later be used against parties at the adjudicatory stage. We
argue that, in order to build trust in the process and to keep open as many
outcomes as possible, it is appropriate to prevent discovery of "mediation
communications," 226 and that one possibility would be to include a
nondisclosure or confidentiality provision in the Commission's Procedural
Rules.
It is important to note, however, that the Parades Commission does not
have a monopoly on third-party interventions, and a number of external
mediators have been involved in different situations. On occasion, mediative
interventions have taken place concurrently with different organizations
sponsoring different initiatives. This spawning of uncoordinated
interventions potentially sustains a belief that if one initiative does not work,
there will always be another available, possibly with a more sympathetic
mediator. That said, the potential for independent mediators to facilitate truly
communicative dialogue between disputing parties has recently been
demonstrated in relation to two of the most contentious parades. In 2005, the
Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council,
Duncan Morrow, was invited by the Parades Commission to facilitate private
discussions between a leading Belfast Orangeman and a representative of a
local residents' group in advance of the Whiterock parade in July 2005.227
While no agreement was reached, and despite the violence in September
2005, this mediation process was restarted in 2006 and it seems likely that
these talks-which ultimately again failed to reach full agreement-were
important in preventing the escalation of the dispute in June 2006. It had also
been agreed in the terms of the dialogue process that any agreements would
be reported to the Commission, but (crucially) the discussions leading to
those agreements would not. The Commission's determination thus stated:
The Commission has heard that an understanding has been reached on
the issues of music; size of the parade; and on flags to be displayed. In line
with the terms of the dialogue process agreed at its outset, the Commission
225 Id.
2 26 See also Ellen E. Deason, Competing and Complimentary Rule Systems: Civil
Procedure and ADR: Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and
Mediation--Worldwide, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 553, 562-565 (2005).
227 See Orangeman Met with Republican, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northemireland/4638971.stm; see also Orangemen should
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accepts the understanding reached on the issues during the process and has
reflected this in its determination. 228
Similarly, another independent mediator-Bob Fryer-was invited by
the Parades Commission to initiate a mediation process for parades in the
Ardoyne area of North Belfast. This resulted in an agreement over the Tour
of the North parade 229 and an agreement in relation to the morning parade
past Ardoyne on July 12, 2006. The determination of the evening Ardoyne
parade on July 12 read: "The Commission has heard that there is an
understanding in relation to the morning parade on 12 July. We recognise
this understanding and do not, therefore, place any restrictions on the
morning parade. ' '230
These mediators, whilst funded by the Commission, do not report to the
Commission on the substantive nature of the discussions. In many ways,
therefore, this process of inviting independent external mediators to mediate
particular disputes addresses the criticisms relating to neutrality and
confidentiality, and aligns with recent recommendations for reform of the
Commission.2 3 1 The only remaining design problem concerns the way in
228 Parades Comm'n, No. 9 District LOL Parade Notified to Take Place in Belfast
on Saturday 24 June 2006 10 (2006), available at
http://www.paradescommission.org/Parades/index.cfm.
229 See Agreement Over Contentious March, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northemireland/5077756.stm.
230 Parades Comm'n, Ligoniel True Blues Parade 6 (July 12, 2006), available at
http://www.paradescommission.org/Parades/index.cfm.
231 The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, for example, recommended that the
mediation and determination functions of the Parades Commission should be clearly
distinguished, and that the Commission should review and develop its role in mediation.
See N. IR. AFFAIRS COMM., THE PARADES COMMISSION, H.C. 120-I, at para. 78 (2000-
01). The Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) gave a qualified endorsement
of the proposal in the Quigley Report for a "stronger and more structured role for a
facilitation function." See CAJ's RESPONSE TO SIR GEORGE QUIGLEY'S REVIEW OF THE
PARADES COMMISSION AND PUBLIC PROCESSIONS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1998 25,
at 5 (Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with authors). CAJ also highlighted the importance of "the
establishment of procedural safeguards such as the optional nature of the
mechanism.. . and non-permeable walls between determination and facilitation." Id. at
29, 32. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission stated that it "is generally in
favour of the separation of the two functions of mediation/facilitation and adjudication."
See RESPONSE BY THE NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO THE QUIGLEY
REVIEW ON THE PARADES COMMISSION AND PUBLIC PROCESSIONS (NORTHERN IRELAND)
ACT 1998 13, at 5 (Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with authors). Similarly, the Labour
Relations Agency argued for "the organisational separation of the resolution function and
the adjudication function" with an emphasis on codes of practice and operational
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which the Commission should receive evidence from the parties after such
externally facilitated mediation has finished if it too fails to generate
agreement. At this stage, the Commission must issue a legal determination
imposing restrictions on the parade and on the related protest, which may
require the Commission to hear again from the parties. But if the parties
believe they can cut a better deal with the Commission than is possible
during mediated dialogue (that their interests would be better served at the
"trial"), they might deliberately not reach an accommodation even in a
mediation process facilitated independently of the Commission. It seems,
therefore, that it will be important for the Commission to emphasize that any
final hearing which takes place after mediation will not provide another
opportunity for parties to explore the various options with the Commission.
Rather, it is simply for parties to brief the Commission on what they perceive
as the key issues and interests at stake, and for the Commission then to arrive
at a binding legal determination. Preventing opportunities for dialogue in the
adjudicatory process may provide an incentive to engage in genuine dialogue
during mediation, even encouraging parties to play their best cards early and
hastening a mutually acceptable accommodation.
IV. "CLARIFYING THE PUBLIC INTEREST"? 232
We have noted that institutional design is invariably culturally
embedded. It was widely understood that the conflict over parades could not
be dealt with within the peace talks and the Multi-Party ("Belfast" or "Good
Friday") Agreement. It was particularly clear in 1998, the year the
Agreement was signed and also the year the Drumcree parade was rerouted,
that the Parades Commission was acting to deflect an element of the conflict
that might otherwise have engulfed and threatened the political talks and
subsequent referendum. Thus, the Parades Commission has served as both an
institutional stopgap (perhaps until municipal structures can be entrusted with
these politically charged decisions) and a buffer (distancing new policing and
governance structures from the potential tremors of parade disputes). Despite
the transitional moment marked by the Belfast Agreement, there has not been
guidelines. See Letter from Bill Patterson, Chief Executive Labour Relations Agency to
the Northern Ireland Office, Re. Quigley Review of the Parades Commission: Extension
of Consultation Period 5 (May 9, 2003) (on file with authors).
232 NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 4, at 109.
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an overnight transformation of policing 233 and the devolved government has
faced several crises since it was first established. 234 The example of the
Parades Commission thus cautions against placing unrealistic expectations
on a single institution, and serves as a reminder that other fundamental
institutional reforms may also be necessary.
In 1997, the North Review team surmised that, in five years time, it
might be that "the overall political situation and inter-communal relations
will have stabilised to the extent that son:e of the structures we recommend
could be dismantled. '235 Instead, however, five official reviews of the
Parades Commission have occurred in the space of six years (between
November 1999 and March 2006)236 and the government has admitted that
"Northern Ireland remains a deeply segregated society with little indication
of progress towards becoming more tolerant or inclusive. '237 Furthermore,
233 See Mary O'Rawe, Transitional Policing Arrangements in Northern Ireland:
The Can't and the Won't of the Change Dialectic, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1015, 1035
(2003).
234 At the time of writing, the Northern Ireland Assembly remained suspended.
235 THE NORTH REPORT, supra note 62, at 204. This sentiment is echoed in the
Commission's guidelines. PARADES COMM'N, PUBLIC PROCESSIONS AND PARADES 2
(1999).
236 The first of these was an internal review conducted by the NIO. This was
conducted between early November 1999 and late January 2000. N. IR. AFFAIRS COMM.,
THE PARADES COMMISSION, H.C. 120-11, at 86 (2000-01). The second was an inquiry by
the Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee, which was launched in March 2000, and
reported in May 2001. N. IR. AFFAIRS COMM., THE PARADES COMMISSION, H.C. 120-II
(2000-2001). The third was an independent review of the operation of the Commission
and the Public Processions (NI) Act 1998 by Sir George Quigley. THE QUIGLEY REPORT,
supra note 131. Sir George Quigley was appointed by the NIO on November 27, 2001,
and submitted his report to the Secretary of State on September 27, 2002. The Secretary
of State then set a period for public consultation on the Quigley recommendations-the
initial deadline was January 31, 2003, but this was extended until April 30, 2003 meaning
"that any new arrangements requiring legislation would not be in place until the 2005
marching season." Northern Ireland Office, http://www.nio.gov.uk/press/030206a.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006). Ultimately, the government rejected the main
recommendations of the Quigley Report. Fourth, was another inquiry by the Northern
Ireland Affairs Select Committee, N. IR. AFFAIRS COMM., THE PARADES COMMISSION
AND PUBLIC PROCESSIONS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1998, H.C. 172-I (2004-05), and
most recently, the ongoing NIO consultation on mediation measures for disputed parades
(NIO, MEDIATION MEASURES FOR PARADES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2005), available at
http://www.nio.gov.uk/mediation_measures for parades-in-northemireland_-
_a_consultaiondocument.pdf).
237 COMMUNITY RELATIONS UNIT, OFMDFM A CONSULTATION PAPER ON
IMPROVING RELATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1.3, at 4 (2003); see NORTHERN
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the findings of a survey in 2001 revealed that only 35% of Catholics and 8%
of Protestants felt the Parades Commission had improved the situation, with
50% of Protestants and 14% of Catholics believing that the Commission had
actually made the situation worse.238 An earlier survey in 1999 found that
only fifteen of those questioned believed that the Commission was
successful, and it would therefore appear that little, if any, progress has been
made. 239 Yet, these public attitude findings are not surprising given the
Commission's inability to draw upon the normal forms of legitimacy in a
democratic society.
It might be argued that the cost of policing certain parades, or indeed, the
entire marching season, can provide a more reliable indicator of progress.
Such an analysis suggests that some progress has been made since the
Commission's establishment. In the years 1998, 1999, and 2000, the cost of
policing the protest at Drumcree in July was £11 million, £6 million, and
£5.5 million, respectively.240 This downward trend has continued-in 2000,
the Average Daily Hours (ADH) of police overtime peaked in July with
22,800 ADH. In 2001, this figure decreased to 20,500 ADH, while in 2002
the July peak was lower again at 17,300 ADH.241 Furthermore, during the
period July to December 1998, the monthly cost of maintaining a police
presence at Drumcree was approximately £0.4 million,242 whilst by 2002,
this monthly post-July premium had reduced to £54,250.243 On the first
Saturday in July 2003 and 2004, "[t]he PSNI costs of security arrangements
IRELAND SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY (1989-1996), available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/research/nisas/nisas.htm; NORTHERN IRELAND LIFE AND
TIMES SURVEY (1998), available at http://www.ark.ac.uk (suggesting a recent
deterioration in community relations through monitored attitudes of the population).
2 3 8 NORTHERN IRELAND STATISTICS AND RESEARCH AGENCY, OMNIBUS SURVEY
(2001), reprinted in PARADES COMM'N, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 2000-2001, at 30-32
(2001).
239 RESEARCH AND EVALUATION SERVICES SURVEY (1999), reprinted in PARADES
COMM'N, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, at 25-26 (2000).
240 Memorandum from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in N. IR. AFFAIRS COMM.,
THE PARADES COMMISSION, H.C. 120-1I at 70 (2000-01).
241 PSNI CHIEF CONSTABLE'S ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002, at 14 (2002).
242 325 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 480 (responding to written question
69882 by Kevin McNamara); see also 329 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 535
(responding to written question 80914 by Mr. MacKay).
243 631 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2002) WA90 (responding to question HL 2209
by Lord Eames).
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for the parades of Portadown Loyal Orange Lodge No. I to Drumcree
Church" were £221,810 and £ 177,43 7, respectively. 244
The cost of policing the disorder which followed the restricted Whiterock
parade in September 2005, however, has been estimated at over £3
million.245 This suggests that there is little room for complacency. Indeed, the
utility of these bare figures as a progress indicator is questionable. The cost
of policing parades and protests is contingent upon police-community
relations, and these are influenced by many factors other than the parades
issue (not least of all, political attitudes towards the police service itself).246
Furthermore, simply measuring the cost effectiveness of the policing
operation says nothing of the principles upon which decisions are made, and
whether those decisions are likely to lay the foundation for a shared future. 247
We framed this case study by asking the broader question of whether
ADR mechanisms could serve to deepen democratic dialogue. While
Northern Ireland's transitional context might suggest that straightforward
parallels should not be drawn with institutional design decisions in more
stable settings, our broad conclusions do not presuppose any particular
cultural or institutional starting point. We suggested that the concept of
244 631 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2002) WA172. Approximate costs of policing
the Tour of the North Orange march in Belfast (the route of which changes on alternate
years, resulting in different deployments) were £64,390 in 2004 and £74,533 in 2005. 435
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 1325W (responding to question 7148 by Lady
Hermon).
245 policing Parade Trouble Cost £3m, BBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northemireland/4394158.stm.
246 Parades Comm'n, Parkmount Junior LOL No. 150 Parade in Portadown (May 25,
2002) (unpublished determination, on file with authors). Significantly, in July 2006, a
senior member of Sinn Fein, Gerry Kelly, held talks with senior police officers to discuss
the policing arrangements for the July 12 parade in Ardoyne in North Belfast. Praise
After Peaceful Twelfth, BBC NEWS, July 13, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northemireland/5175356.stm. This, despite the fact that Sinn
Fein has so far refused to sit on the Policing Board or to take part in local District
Policing Partnerships arguing that the changes to the RUC recommended by the Patten
Report have not yet been fully implemented. See, e.g., Rea is Re-elected Board
Chairman, BBC NEWS, April 6, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northernireland/4880342.stm.
247 For example, the cost of upholding the Parades Commission's decision in 1998
to prevent Portadown Orangemen from parading along the Garvaghy Road was greater
than had been the (direct) cost of facilitating the parade in previous years. In the three
years prior to the enactment of the PPA, the cost of police manpower directly employed
in policing the Drumcree parade was £960,000 in 1995, £2,110,000 in 1996, and
£680,000 in 1997. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 251 (responding to question
44749 by Mr. Salter).
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"democratic triangulation"-with ADR mechanisms mediating between state
institutions/public policy and cultural values-holds open the prospect that
new fora for dialogic interaction can catalyze and consolidate advances
toward a more peaceful society. This occurs first, by animating the reform of
insensate institutions, and second, by facilitating more inclusive dialogue
about the normative values underpinning public policy (whether community
relations, shared space, or how best to realize basic human rights standards).
The Parades Commission has had some success at both levels. In relation to
animating reform of existing institutions, new models of policing have been
developed which take a more holistic view of the policing of public space.
Rather than merely resorting to the usual tools of public order policing, the
use of mediative practices, monitoring and marshalling as part of an
integrated package has offered a much wider range of possibilities for
managing (and even preventing) conflict. With regard to facilitating more
inclusive dialogue, certainly, the establishment of the Parades Commission
has provided greatly enhanced opportunities for parties to make
representations to the decisionmaking body, and to engage in meaningful
discussion about the management of public events. It is unfortunate that not
all parties have availed of these channels. While there is room for
improvement, the structure of the Parades Commission has ensured that more
adversarial processes remain a last resort. Thus, through innovative
institutional and procedural design, the Commission demonstrates that law
can provide a framework which is attuned to inputs as much as outputs. In
doing so, it maximizes the potential for pragmatic accommodations which
recognize all the interests at stake.
Yet, there is no necessary correlation between the quantity of democratic
participation and the quality of democratic deliberation. While the creation of
the Parades Commission has undoubtedly extended the means for building
mediative capacity, opportunities to stimulate greater consensus around the
underlying interests, values and norms at stake have been missed. Two
factors in particular have inhibited the Commission's contribution to
deepening democracy. First, the Parades Commission has not done enough to
stimulate the background consensus which Habermas views as critical to
moving parties from strategic to more communicative action.248 Without this
consensus, the vocabularies of community relations and human rights will
remain contested. We argue that this framing, or clarifying, of the public
interest is an essential strand in deepening Northern Ireland's post-conflict
democracy. Greater openness and transparency in the adjudicatory process
should accelerate the prospect of resolution by holding parties accountable to
248 See THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 18.
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their public transcript and limiting the potential for strategic maneuvering.
Second, the bargaining work of the AOs has been constrained by the
institutional design. While the AOs have become very skilled in engaging
with different individuals and groups, and have been able to play a key role
in deescalating tensions and reducing the likelihood of violence, greater
attention must be devoted to devising structures which ensure both the
neutrality of mediators and the confidentiality of the process. This might
involve retaining the capacity to carry out the evidence gathering and pre-
dialogic work presently undertaken by the AOs, but it also suggests there is a
need to avail of independent mediators-possibly following the example of
the independently facilitated initiatives in the Whiterock and Ardoyne
disputes. Such mechanisms could help redeem the concept of mediation and
add depth to the substance of any engagement that occurs, with positive
ramifications for democratic consolidation.
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